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Abstract: Chapter 1 – Intergenerational Transfer Inflows to Adult Children of Divorce. Do adult 
children of divorce receive less money from their parents than children of intact unions? Are they less 
likely to receive parental help for buying a house, starting a business or weathering a financial crisis?  
Though there is evidence that an individual divorced parent gives less to his child than he would give if 
he were married to his child’s other parent, no study has examined the transfers given by both divorced 
parents.  I approach the question of transfers to adult children of divorce from a fresh angle by asking not, 
“How much did the parent give?” but instead, “How much did the child get?”  I also examine the 
correlation between parents’ remarriage and transfers received.  Using data from the 1988 wave of the 
PSID, I find that parental divorce and remarriage are uncorrelated with the incidence of a transfer.  Within 
the select group of children who receive a transfer, however, divorce is correlated with an increased 
transfer amount, while a father’s remarriage is correlated with a decreased amount.   
Chapter 2 – The Correlation Between Subjective Parental Longevity and Intergenerational Transfers. 
Are parental financial transfers to adult children correlated with subjective parental longevity?  Despite 
rapid and continuing increases in life expectancy, no previous study has looked at transfers in relation to 
parents’ opinions of how long they will live.  This paper uses the subjective survival probability data 
included in the Health and Retirement Study to examine this potential correlation for a select group of 
unmarried older parents.  For mothers only, I consistently find modest positive correlations between 
subjective longevity and anticipated future inter vivos transfers and bequests.  For fathers, I find a non-
linear relationship between subjective longevity and anticipated future inter vivos transfers.  I discuss the 
potential reasons for these descriptive results and some further questions that arise from them. 
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Chapter 1 - Intergenerational Transfer Inflows to Adult 
Children of Divorce 
 
1. Introduction1 
 
 
How do adult children of divorce fare when it comes to receiving financial assistance from 
their parents? While it is well-known that divorce reduces the economic well-being of minors 
(McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994, Hetherington, Bridges and Insabella, 1998), far less is known 
about the relationship between divorce and parental economic support once children enter 
adulthood.   
 
In principle, divorce may matter little.  For instance, if married parents and divorced parents 
care equally about the well-being of their children, then, all else equal, divorce may not affect 
transfers at all.  But many other factors can come into play: the emotional fallout of divorce may 
reduce parental altruism, remarriage could increase or decrease a parent’s economic resources, or 
parents might now use gifts to compete for a child’s attention or affection, to name but a few.  As 
the effects of divorce are difficult to predict, ex ante, the question becomes an empirical one.   
 
This paper will not determine if any causal relationship between divorce, remarriage and 
transfers exists or does not exist, because the unobservable factors related to divorce and 
remarriage make these variables highly endogenous.  But understanding any potential 
correlations between divorce, remarriage and transfers to adult children is important for both 
                                                          
1
 Many thanks to my advisors, Professors Donald Cox, Peter Gottschalk and Ingela Alger for their comments and 
guidance.  Thanks also to Professor Arthur Lewbel and other participants in the Dissertation Seminar at the Boston 
College Economics Department, and to Richard Johnson of the Urban Institute, for his comments as a discussant at the 
Population Associaton of America Conference, 2007.   
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policy-makers and social scientists.  As the traditional nuclear family - two married parents 
whose only children are born of that union - edges toward minority status, the question becomes 
more pressing.  Transfers, while not the key to most people’s economic well-being, can be very 
important at critical life stages, providing both a leg up and a safety net.  Take home buying, for 
example.  It is estimated that around 20% of first-time homebuyers receive a transfer from their 
parents, and that the mean transfer amount is more than 50% of the down payment.  (Englehardt 
and Mayer, 1998) Would we expect children of divorce to be shortchanged by their parents when 
compared to children from intact families?  
 
The literature to date has not addressed this question.  Divorce and remarriage have received 
almost no attention in the economics literature on private transfer behavior, where the focus has 
been on studying the effect of income variations on transfer amounts.  The sociology literature, 
on the other hand, pays much more attention to family structure and transfers, but for the most 
part it only looks at the incidence of a transfer, not the amount.   
 
The most salient deficiency in the literature, however, is in how the question is approached.  
All of the research, with very few exceptions, asks “How much did the parent give?” instead of 
“How much did the child get?”  The well-being of the child depends on this second question.  If 
the typical divorced father gives $70 to his child, instead of the $100 he would have given if 
married to the child’s mother, but the mother gives $70 on her own too, the child has a net gain.  
This would be missed if one only looked at one parent’s giving.   
 
In this paper I approach the question from a fresh point of view.  I ask, “How much did the 
child get from both parents?” and “How does this amount compare to what children of an intact 
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married couple received?”  What I find invites further study not only into the continuing 
economic effects of divorce and remarriage, but also into the underlying motivations for transfers 
from parents, divorced or otherwise.   
 
There are reasons to expect that divorce, per se, would not have as great an impact on 
transfers to adults as it does on transfers to minors.  Non-custodial parents of minor children must 
pass any transfers they intend for their children (child-support) through the hands of their ex-
spouses, who can then spend part of the transfer on their own consumption, if they choose.  
Transfers to adult children are given directly to the child, regardless of the marital status of the 
parents.  This makes the dynamics of transfers to adult children of divorced parents very similar 
to those of adult children of married parents.   
 
What is not similar, however, is the presence of stepparents, which only occurs in the case of 
children of divorce.  The dynamics of the stepparent relationship could have varying effects on 
transfer levels.  The presence of a stepparent may be a source of increased economic resources to 
which an adult child can appeal for help, leading to greater transfers perhaps, than those observed 
in children of non-remarried families or even intact families.  Or, it may be that a stepparent’s 
lack of altruism toward a stepchild may result in him guarding the couple’s resources for himself 
or for his children, imposing a constraint on the biological parent’s ability to give.   
 
What I find is that divorce and remarriage are uncorrelated with the incidence of a transfer.  
All else equal, children of divorce are just as likely to receive a transfer from one or both of their 
parents as their peers from intact families.  Neither is the mean amount that they receive any 
different for children of divorce, when looking at population as a whole; in a selection-corrected 
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model, divorce and remarriage are uncorrelated with transfer amount.  If, however, you take the 
select group of children who receive a transfer, conditional upon income and siblings and other 
variables, divorce is correlated with an increase in transfer amount, while a father’s remarriage is 
correlated with a decreased amount.  The mother’s remarriage, on the other hand, has no 
significant correlation.   
 
Why might such patterns occur?  The exchange motivation for transfers offers one potential 
explanation.  Say that transfers are really motivated by parents’ desire to obtain services of some 
type from their child, either in the present or in the future.  When parents divorce, they now must 
compete for those services.  The child is faced with providing care to two aging parental 
households instead of one, and with the increased demand for his services, the price would go up.  
If the father remarries, however, a (usually) younger wife can be expected to live longer than the 
father and provide almost all the care the father will need as he ages.  Demand for the child’s 
services drops, and transfers do as well.   
 
This is just one scenario, however.  It is the objective of this paper to pin down the empirical 
patterns themselves, which then open the doors to many possible scenarios, and many interesting 
questions.  What follows is a review of what the literature to date tells us about family structure 
and transfers from parents to children.  Then I lay out a very simple model of parental transfers to 
provide some insight into how divorce and remarriage might affect total transfer amounts. 
Finally, I use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to test if an adult child’s ability to 
obtain transfers from his or her parents is related to family structure.   
 
1.1  What is Known about Divorce Remarriage and Transfers 
 
8 
 
Much is known about the economic consequences of divorce for minor children, and how 
outcomes in adulthood are affected by the childhood experience of divorce and remarriage.  
Children decline in socioeconomic status, educational attainment and eventual occupational 
attainment and increase their likelihood of negative outcomes such as early childbearing and 
delinquency following a divorce.  (McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994, Cherlin, 1992) The decrease 
in income that accompanies divorce is the single most important factor in all of these outcomes.  
Estimates of the magnitude of this drop vary, but a conservative estimate puts the decline in 
standard of living of the custodial mother at about 30% on average, while the non-custodial 
father’s standard of living increases by 10 to 15%. (Hoffman and Duncan, 1988)  
 
The remarriage of parents does have a mitigating effect on household income, but it is 
unclear whether this provides any significant benefit for minor children.  In fact, the case may be 
that the well-being of children in stepfamily households is no better than that of children living in 
divorced, single-parent homes.  (Cherlin, 1992, Cherlin and Furstenberg, 1994) The benefits of an 
increase in household income may be offset by the stressors related to remarriage, some of which 
stem from increased conflict over family finances.  (Hetherington, Bridges and Insabella, 1998).  
The gender of the stepparent may also be a factor in the child’s outcome.  Case, McLanahan and 
others have demonstrated decreased investments in food and healthcare, and a poorer educational 
outcome in children being cared for by a stepmother in a remarried home versus a biological 
mother in a remarried home.  (Case, Lin and McLanahan, 2000a, Case, Lin and McLanahan, 
2000b and Case and Paxson, 2001) They have not as yet carried this approach into looking at 
investments in adult children.   
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The effect of divorce on relationships between parents and adult children is a well-
studied topic in the sociological literature, and it is in this context that several sociologists have 
examined transfers.  There is consensus that a single or divorced parent is less likely to give 
money to his adult child than he would be as part of an intact parent couple.  (Furstenberg, 
Hoffman and Shrestha, 1995, Amato, Rezac and Booth, 1995, White, 1992) Whether or not the 
child is as likely, less likely, or more likely to receive a transfer from either parent has not been 
well explored.  One study that provides some insight into this issue is Amato, Rezac and Booth 
(1995), who examined the role that parental marital quality, divorce and remarriage has on 
various helping variables between parents and adult children.  Using a random sample of 443 
families with young adult children (364 intact families and 79 divorced families), Amato, et al 
found that the probability of receiving a transfer from either parent (or giving a transfer to a 
parent) was essentially the same as receiving a transfer from married biological parents, except in 
the case of transfers needed for higher education.  In that case, children of divorce were found to 
be less likely overall to obtain a transfer.  How the quantity of the transfer compares with the 
quantity received by children of intact families was not examined.   
 
Indeed, most papers in sociology have not looked at transfer amounts, due most likely to 
their concern with transfers as indicative of a support relationship, and not as a resource for 
overcoming liquidity constraints.  Some have, however, looked at remarriage and step-
relationships and have found that parental remarriage has little or no effect on the probability of a 
transfer.  Furstenberg, Hoffman and Shrestha (1995) used data from the PSID to demonstrate that 
divorce lowers the probability of a transfer from mothers and to an even greater extent from 
fathers, and find that remarriage has no significant effect on the probability of a transfer.  Amato, 
Rezac and Booth (1995) found a minimal increase in the probability of help received from 
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mothers (where help is an index variable that includes help in transportation, childcare, home or 
car repairs, housework, and advice/encouragement), and no significant difference in help received 
from fathers as a result of remarriage.   
 
There is a substantial economics literature examining transfers between parents and 
children, but the effects of divorce and remarriage on transfers have not been explicitly 
researched.  In empirical examinations, when divorce is included as a regressor in transfer 
estimations (which has been done in very few papers), the results are varied.  Cox and Rank 
(1992), using data from the National Survey of Families and Households found, that “parents 
together” is correlated with an increased likelihood of receiving a transfer from parents.  McGarry 
and Schoeni (1995) and McGarry (1999) used data from the Health and Retirement Survey to 
find that a donor parent being married (whether to the child’s other parent or to a stepparent the 
two cases are not distinguished) results in both a lower incidence of transfers and a lower mean 
transfer amount from the parent.  Controlling for household income and wealth, this is attributed 
to married implying more adults in the parent’s household and less income available to give to a 
child.  Villanueva (2002) used the PSID to analyze incoming transfers to married couples.  He 
included husband’s parents divorced and wife’s parents divorced as regressors, but did not 
discuss the results, nor report their significance in the tables showing the results of his tobit and 
OLS regressions, some of which show a positive relationship between divorce and the incidence 
and amount of a transfer.  Even Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff’s (1997) well-cited paper on 
altruism and transfers included divorce and remarriage as regressors in the transfer equations, but 
then never reported the results.   
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The primary theoretical focus in the economics literature has been to use income effects 
on transfers to help determine the underlying motivations for transfers - altruism, exchange or, 
more recently, genetic fitness.  (Becker, 1981, Bernheim, Schleifer and Summers, 1985, Altonji, 
Hayashi & Kotlikoff, 1996 and 1997, Cox, 1987 and 1990, Cox and Rank, 1992, McGarry & 
Schoeni, 1995, Case, et al., 2000b).  In the altruism model (Becker 1981), parents give to their 
children because the child’s utility enters in the parent’s own utility function.  In the exchange 
models (Cox 1987), parents give because they expect some sort of service in return from their 
children, and this service is what enters the parent’s utility function.   
 
The genetic fitness motive, which is just starting to gain attention, (Case, Lin and 
McLanahan 2000b) implies that parents give to their children not out of some generic desire for 
their well-being, but out of a more instinctual drive to ensure that the children will carry on the 
parents’ genetic material.  For example, it may be that parents pay for a child’s college education 
in order to make him or her more likely to earn a good income, attract a healthy, productive 
spouse and thus be more fit and likely to bear children with a good chance of reproductive 
success.  Only in this third realm has an examination of divorce and stepfamily relationships been 
prominent, and the findings, as mentioned above, are that stepmothers in particular invest less in 
non-biological minor children than in their biological children.   
 
The most explicit theoretical modeling of the effects of divorce on minor children’s 
consumption comes from Weiss and Willis (1985), who model children as collective goods in a 
marriage characterized by altruistic parents.  In the Weiss and Willis model, a type of tragedy of 
the commons occurs post-divorce.  The loss of control of non-custodial parents over expenditures 
on children, combined with the fact that fathers and mothers no longer account for the utility 
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gained by the ex-spouse in their determination of the optimal expenditure on the child, results in 
lower-than-optimal allocations to children.   
 
In the following section I elaborate a very simple model of parental transfers in order to gain 
some insights on how divorce and remarriage might affect transfers to adult children.  Key 
features of the model include altruism as the motivation for parental giving and the use of game 
theory to establish the optimal transfers to children post-divorce.  It does not feature the Weiss 
and Willis (1985) tragedy of the commons result because of a differently specified utility 
function, but, like their model, it shows how the method of transfer to the child (either through the 
ex-spouse or directly to the child) affects the transfer amount.  Most importantly for this paper, it 
demonstrates how the simple fact of remarriage, holding all else constant, could result in lower 
transfers to an adult child.   
  
2. A Model of Parental Transfers with Varied Family Types  
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This model outlines resource allocation by altruistic parents in three types of families 
intact, divorced, and remarried.  It shows that divorce, per se, has no effect on transfers to adult 
children, under the strictures of this model, except in the case that one parent has a much higher 
income than the other.  In that case, transfers actually increase post-divorce, because the higher 
earning parent no longer has to subsidize the consumption of the lower earning parent and gives 
more to the child.  Remarriage, however, results in lower transfers, even when income levels and 
number of children remain constant.  This results from the type of intra-couple bargaining that 
determines transfers, and the lowered level of altruism of stepparents toward their non-biological 
children.   
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Each parent’s utility is based on own consumption, the consumption of a spouse (if 
married) and the consumption of an adult child and an adult stepchild (if remarried).  I will 
assume that spouses value each other’s consumption the same as their own, but may be less (or 
more) altruistic toward their children.  Married couples engage in cooperative bargaining to 
determine allocation of total family income.  Divorced parents play a Cournot-type game to 
determine their own consumption and a transfer to their child, taking the other parent’s transfer as 
given.  Remarried parents engage in a combination of the two games, bargaining with their 
spouses and allocating money toward transfers to their children, taking the other parents’ transfers 
as given.   
 
2.2  Baseline - The Intact Family  
 
As a baseline, I look at how married parents allocate consumption in a very simple model 
of parental altruism.  Take a family with only three members, a mother, a father and one adult 
child.  Assume that parents m and f, denoting mother and father respectively, engage in 
cooperative bargaining to allocate their income.  The mother’s and father’s utility is based on 
their own and each other’s consumption, cm and cf, weighted equally, and the consumption of their 
adult child, ck, discounted by the altruism parameter >0.   
 
ln ln lnf m f m kU U c c cα= = + +    (1) 
The parents each have an endowment income, If and Im, making their resource constraint:  
 f m f m kI I c c T+ = + +  (2) 
The child has an endowment income as well, Ik, so his consumption depends on that income and 
the parents transfer, Tk. 
 k k kc I T= +  (3) 
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The Nash bargaining solution is a trivial one, because the parents value their own and their 
spouse’s consumption equally, resulting in a simple maximization of the shared utility function 
subject to the resource constraints.  (See Appendix A.1.) In essence, as long as transfers are 
positive, the parents allocate the shares of total family income among the three members in 
proportion to the weight they put on their own and their child’s utility.  The parents’ consumption 
levels are:  
 
2
f m kInt Int
f m
I I I
c c
α
+ +
= =
+
 (4) 
 
The transfer they give their child is: 
 
( ) 2
2
f m kInt
k
I I I
T
α
α
+ −
=
+
 (5) 
 
And the child’s resulting consumption level is: 
 
( )
2
f m kInt
k
I I I
c
α
α
+ +
=
+
 (6) 
 
The superscript Int denotes the intact family state. 
 
A positive transfer goes to the child as long as the child’s income is sufficiently low 
relative to the parent’s incomes and their altruism parameter. 
 
( )
2
f m
k
I I
I
α +
<
 (7) 
 
Now that the baseline transfer level for the child with married parents is established, I look at two 
cases for non-intact families and their resulting transfers.   
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2.3  Case 1 - Divorced Parents with Direct Transfers  
In this case, the biological parents are divorced and no remarriage has taken place.  The 
parents each make transfers to their adult child and as a result of making these transfers directly 
as opposed to indirectly through an ex-spouse, adult children maintain their pre-divorce transfer 
levels, under certain assumptions.  These assumptions include that both parents maintain their 
pre-divorce incomes and pre-divorce levels of altruism toward the child, and that the parents’ and 
child’s incomes fall within a certain range of each other’s.   
 
This result contrasts with the result for minor children under the traditional (indirect) 
child support transfer regime, whereby a non-custodial parent makes transfers to his or her ex-
spouse, the custodial parent, who then chooses how much to spend on the child.  Under the 
traditional system, children’s transfers decrease after a divorce.  (This outcome, which parallels 
the Weiss & Willis (1985) result, is outlined in Appendix A.2.)  
 
Here, both parents play a Cournot game, whereby they choose utility-maximizing 
consumption levels for themselves and transfer levels to their child, taking the other parent’s 
transfer as given.  The setup is symmetric for the father and mother, so I need look only at the 
father’s problem.   
 
The father maximizes utility based on his own and his child’s consumption:  
 
ln lnf f kU c cα= +  (8) 
 
keeping in mind that his child’s consumption now depends on his own income and transfers 
received separately from the mother and the father.   
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f m
k kc I T T= + +  (9) 
 
(The overbar indicates that the father takes the mother’s transfer as given.) The maximization is 
subject to the resource constraint:  
 
 
f
f fI c T= +  (10) 
 
The solution to this Cournot game results in the equilibrium transfers from both parents, and total 
transfers under divorce ( DivkT ) to the child:  
 
(1 ) ( )
(2 )
f k mf I I IT
α
α
+ − +
=
+
 (11) 
 
 
(1 ) ( )
(2 )
m k fm I I IT
α
α
+ − +
=
+
 (12) 
 
 
( ) 2
(2 )
m f kDiv
k
I I I
T
α
α
+ −
=
+
 (13) 
 
The total transfer to the child, DivkT  (13), is equal to the transfer given by married 
parents, IntkT (5).  Note that the parents’ incomes must stay within a certain range of each other’s 
and the child’s in order for there to be a positive transfer from each of them.  For example, for the 
mother to make a transfer, her income must satisfy the condition:  
 
1
f k
m
I I
I
α
+
>
+
 (14) 
 
If the father’s or the child’s income is very high relative to hers, she will be better off 
simply spending her income on her own consumption.  Of course, the higher her degree of 
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altruism, the greater the income spread would have to be to make her withhold a transfer.  As 
long as there are positive transfers from both parents, consumption of the father, the mother and 
the child stay the same as in the intact family state.   
 
Because the father and mother continue to consume equally, their utility levels are equal 
as well.  This utility determines the threat point in the Nash Bargaining game between parents and 
their new spouses which takes place in the case with remarried parents.  (See Appendix A.3 for 
all of the above derivations.)  
 
What if the parents have incomes that differ to the extent that one parent does not provide 
a transfer to the child?  In that case this model predicts that the child will actually receive a higher 
transfer.  (See Appendix A.4.) The intuition for this is that in the intact family state, the parent 
with the higher income had to direct a large share of that income to the other parent’s 
consumption.  Post-divorce, that parent will be able to spend more on the child.  Although it may 
seem counterintuitive that divorce would actually raise transfer levels, the empirical analysis 
below will support this result.   
 
The potential equal outcomes for mothers, fathers and children pre- and post-divorce is 
reminiscent of Becker’s (1974) Rotten Kid Theorem , in which the presence of an altruistic parent 
prevents children from behaving selfishly, because the parent can adjust transfers to ensure that 
an increase in one child’s income benefits all children (and a decrease equally harms all children).  
In this case, the behavior of a Rotten Ex would be tempered by that person’s altruism toward his 
or her child, which would allow the consumption of the lower-income ex-spouse to remain at pre-
divorce levels.   
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2.4  Case 2 - Remarried Parents  
Having seen that under a direct transfer regime and certain conditions adult children 
achieve pre-divorce transfer levels, I modify that regime to reflect a common situation for 
children of divorce: the presence of stepparents.  What I find in Case 2 is that even though the 
biological parents stay equally altruistic toward their children, and maintain their pre-remarriage 
level of income, the presence of a stepparent with a lower degree of altruism toward the child 
results in a drop in transfers.  The degree of altruism between steps determines how close children 
of remarried parents can get to their pre-remarriage level of transfers.   
 
Let there now be two families, m1, f1, k1 and m2, f2, k2 denoting the members of original 
families 1 and 2 respectively.  The parents of each family divorce and remarry the spouse from 
the other family.  Now there are two stepfamilies: F12, comprised of m1 and f2, and F21, comprised 
of m2 and f1 .  (The adult children are considered to belong to both families.)  
 
Unlike in the original intact family, the spouses now have different utility functions, 
reflecting each one’s altruism toward his or her own biological child, and some degree of altruism 
toward his or her spouse’s child,  γ where γ>0.  Looking at F12, the utility functions are:  
 1 1 2 1 2ln ln ln lnm m f k kU c c c cα γ= + + +  (15) 
 2 1 2 2 1ln ln ln lnf m f k kU c c c cα γ= + + +  (16) 
 
12 21 12 21
1 1 1 2 2 2where  and k k k kc I T T c I T T= + + = + +  (17) 
 
(The subscripts on the T variables refer to the child receiving the transfer, and the superscripts 
refer to the family providing the transfer.)  
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There are two games simultaneously being played in this setup.  One is the bargaining 
between new spouses over consumption and transfers to their children and stepchildren.  The 
other is the Cournot game being played between the two couples over transfers to the children.  
First, I use a Nash Bargaining framework between the new spouses to determine their Best 
Response transfers to each of their children, taking the transfers of the other couple as given.  
Then, the Cournot equilibrium transfers with the other remarried couple can be found through 
substitution.  Details to the solution are found in Appendix A.5.   
 
The equilibrium transfers from each family, total transfer ( RemkT ) and equilibrium 
consumption for each of the children are:  
 
12 21 ( )( ) 4
2(4 )
f m k
k k
I I I
T T
α γ
α γ
+ + −
= =
+ +
 (18) 
 
 
( )( ) 4
4
f m kRem
k
I I I
T
α γ
α γ
+ + −
=
+ +
 (19) 
 
 
( )( )
4
f m kRem Rem
k k k
I I I
c T I
α γ
α γ
+ + +
= + =
+ +
 (20) 
 
Note that in the case that α=γ, the child’s consumption is the same as in the intact state (and the 
same as in the divorced state with no remarriage.) It will be lower otherwise.   
 
The parents’ consumption levels are higher than in the previous cases:  
 1 2
2( )
4
f m kRem Rem
m f
I I I
c c
α γ
+ +
= =
+ +
 (21) 
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Comparing DivkT (13) with RemkT (19), it is clear that remarriage, unlike divorce, lowers 
adult children’s transfer and consumption levels.  The exception is when parents are equally 
altruistic toward their biological and stepchildren (α=γ).  The above result assumes that neither 
income nor altruism change post divorce.  It also assumes that mother’s and father’s incomes fall 
within a certain range of each other and of their child’s income.  (If their incomes are highly 
unequal, the child’s transfer actually increases post divorce.)  Intuitively, this result is appealing: 
as long as a transfer is not going to an ex-spouse, there is no reason why a parent would want his 
child’s utility to change due to divorce, and utility maximizing consumption levels for self and 
child during marriage would not necessarily change.   
 
The introduction of stepparents, however, does lower the transfers to children.  This 
result could be considered surprising given the setup I have chosen: income has not changed, the 
number of biological parents and children have not changed and the biological parents’ altruism 
toward their children has not changed.  It is simply the mechanism by which resources are 
allocated intra- stepfamily, combined with the stepparents’ lower level of altruism toward the 
stepchildren, which results in lowered transfers to the children.   
 
The intuition for this result is that within an intact family, any resources the couple allocates 
away from their own consumption go toward the consumption of their own child, and increase 
both parents’ utilities to the same degree.  In a remarried couple, in order to direct resources 
toward one spouse’s biological child, that spouse has to agree to allow some of the resources to 
be directed to his or her stepchild.  The stepchild’s consumption does not increase the spouse’s 
utility to the same degree that a biological child’s consumption does, and the spouse will prefer a 
lower overall transfer to both children than would be the case if the entire transfer was going to 
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his or her biological child.  In the following section, I will see if the theoretical results for divorce 
and remarriage from this simple model of transfers are supported empirically, using data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics.   
 
3. Empirical Evidence - Transfers from Parents to Children in the 
PSID  
The model elaborated above predicts that exogenous divorce would have no effect on 
parental transfers, holding all else equal, or in some cases might actually cause transfers to 
increase.  It also predicts that remarriage would result in lower transfers.  Using cross-sectional 
data from the PSID, and its Time and Money Transfers Supplement (1988), I examine the 
conditional probabilities and conditional means of total incoming transfers to children from 
parents and stepparents.  I employ a variety of specifications probit analysis of the likelihood of a 
transfer, OLS on transfer amounts, and tobit analysis to correct for selection to see if conditioning 
on family structure variables changes the conditional probability of receiving a transfer and mean 
transfer amount in ways consistent with the theory.   
 
Of course, I ideally want to determine the exogenous effects of divorce and remarriage, and 
be able to say something conclusive about the causality.  Divorce and remarriage are endogenous 
in this model: certain unobservable characteristics of the child’s parents, which are correlated 
with being divorced or remarried, are also correlated with transfer outcomes.  For example, a 
divorced father is more likely than a married father to have deadbeat dad characteristics, which 
would be correlated with lower transfer amounts.  This means that the coefficient for the divorce 
variable in the regression is biased, describing not only the causal effect of divorce on transfers, if 
there is one, but also the coincidental characteristics that may be more prevalent among divorced 
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people.  Typical empirical approaches to eliminate endogeneity bias are to find an instrumental 
variable, or to use longitudinal pre/post-divorce analyses, among others.  (I survey a broader 
range of approaches in Appendix B.)  The latter option is inapplicable to a cross-sectional sample.  
The former, however, would apply if a suitable instrument could be found.   
 
There are two challenges in taking an instrumental variables approach.  The first is simply 
finding an appropriate instrument.  An appropriate instrument is one that is both relevant, 
meaning correlated with the endogenous variable, and exogenous, meaning uncorrelated with the 
error term.  As stated in Gruber (2000), “no previous study has been able to uncover such an 
instrument” for divorce and Gruber in his paper determines that while there is a correlation 
between a state’s implementation of unilateral divorce law (meaning that divorce can take place 
without the consent of both spouses) and the divorce rate in the state, the other channels through 
which unilateral divorce affects marriage and families make it unsuitable as an instrument.   
 
The second challenge is to find separate instruments for divorce, mother’s remarriage and 
father’s remarriage.  While it may be possible to find an instrument for divorce using this data 
(see Appendix B for a further discussion of possible instruments), it is not possible to find three 
instruments.  So even if an instrument for divorce were available, it would be somewhat pointless 
in this model to remove one endogenous variable only to leave two others which carry almost the 
same unobservable characteristics as the first.  Therefore, the empirical analysis that follows 
describes correlations in the conditional means and probabilities, and should not be taken to 
imply causality.   
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The results of the analyses below show no correlation between the family structure variables 
and the propensity to receive a transfer, nor is there correlation between those variables and the 
amount of a transfer in a selection-corrected model.  For the select group of children who receive 
a transfer, however, divorce is positively correlated and father’s remarriage is negatively 
correlated with the total transfer amount.  The theoretical model I described may have some 
intuitive validity in explaining the result for divorce, but the model’s predictions for remarriage 
only hold empirically for a father’s remarriage, and only among the children selected for transfer 
receipt.  This asymmetry in the outcome between mothers and fathers will be further discussed 
below.   
 
 
3.1  The Data 
 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics is a longitudinal survey of households in the 
United States, started in 1968.  The sample, with proper weighting, is representative of all US 
households.  It is particularly useful for the study of transfers for two reasons.  First, the 1988 
wave included a special Time and Money Transfers supplement which details transfers of time 
and money to and from sample households, providing specific details on the relationships 
between the households and the givers and receivers of these transfers.  The second reason is that 
the PSID sample set grows over time with the addition of splitoff households - children leaving 
the base household and forming their own households.  This makes it possible to observe key 
covariates for a subsample of children and their parents.   
 
The 1988 PSID sample consists of 7,114 households.  For the purposes of this analysis, 
only splitoff households with unmarried household heads are included.  (Unmarried means that 
the head is neither married nor cohabiting at the time of the survey.)  The base unit of observation 
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is a household where the head is the child of an original 1968 household, and at least one of his or 
her parents continues to participate in the panel study.  Further paring of the sample is done by 
restricting the observations to those children with two living, non-co resident parents.  The 
subsample then includes 893 households.   
 
3.2  Dependent Variables  
3.2.1 Description  
The dependent variables that are used in the following models are 1) whether a transfer 
from parents or stepparents occurred, and 2) the sum of all transfers from parents or stepparents 
received by the child.  The pertinent survey questions are:  
During 1987, did(you/your family living there) receive any loans, gifts, or support worth 
$100 or more from your [parents/father (and stepmother)/ mother (and stepfather)]?  
And,  
About how much were those loans, gifts or support worth in 1987?  
 
There are two factors that make the dependent variable somewhat less than ideal.  The 
first is the inclusion of loans in the question.  Because there is no way to separate out what are 
loans vs. gifts, I will assume that loans are a type of transfer.  This is common to the transfers 
literature.  The second issue is the censoring of transfers at $100.  $100 is a relatively low 
censoring point when compared with other datasets, and it is probably negligible.  There is the 
risk, however, that this censoring could exclude transfers that occur among families at the lowest 
socioeconomic level in the survey.   
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To determine how significant this censoring might be, I looked at another question in the 
PSID regarding loans, gifts or support given by the respondent to a non-household member.  For 
some reason, no censoring point is included in this question, so any amount is a valid response.  
In the Time and Money Transfer supplement, out of 32,850 reports of helping of any type, 7,708 
of the reports were of loans, gifts or support given by the recipient.  Of these, only 113 
respondents reported transfer amounts of less than $100, so fewer than 1.5% of responses fell in 
this range.  Assuming that the results for transfers received would be similar, I believe it is 
acceptable to ignore the censoring issue, as other authors have done.  (i.e., Altonji, Hayashi & 
Kotlikoff, 1997)  
 
3.2.2 Unconditional Means  
Simple descriptive statistics, comparing the unconditional transfer probabilities and mean 
total transfer amounts for children of divorced vs. intact families provide a starting point for 
analysis.  Overall, unmarried adult children of divorced or never-married parents fare worse than 
their counterparts from intact families, both in the incidence and mean amount of total transfer 
in.ows.  (See Table 1.) The difference in the incidence of a transfer is significant (at the 5% 
level), while the difference in the mean transfer amounts between the two groups is only 
borderline significant (at the 10% level).   
 
Table 1 - Transfers from Parents Received by PSID 1988  
Splitoff Households by Family Type2 
 
 Transfer 
Received 
Mean 
Amount 
From intact families 0.377 
n=531 
$1639 
n=164 
                                                          
2
 Splitoff Households are those households whose parent’s households are also surveyed in the panel.  Divorced 
indicates those families where parents are divorced or never-married.   
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From divorced families 0.292 
n=362 
$986 
n=94 
Note: From PSID 1988Only unmarried children with 2 living parents who do not coreside 
with child included.  Weighted by PSID family weight. 
 
Who gives to the children of divorced families?  While this paper is concerned with the 
total transfers received by children, it is interesting to note how the giving breaks down between 
fathers and mothers.  Of all the children of divorced parents in the sample, 23% received a 
transfer from their mothers and 14% received a transfer from their fathers, while 6% received 
from both their parents.  67% of all the dollars given to these children came from mothers, while 
33% came from fathers.  Essentially, children of divorced families are twice as likely to receive 
from their mothers as from their fathers, and their mothers, on average, give twice as much as 
their fathers give.   
 
Table 2 - Transfers from Parents to Children of Divorced Families  
 
FROM Mother Father 
Transfer received 0.227 
n=353 
0.136 
n=353 
Mean amount $660 
n=92 
$328 
n=92 
Note: From PSID 1988. Only respondents with 2 living divorced or never-married 
parents who do not co reside with child included.  Weighted by PSID family weight.   
 
 
Drilling down on the children of divorced families, Table3 shows the incidence of 
transfers and mean total transfer amounts to these children, by the remarriage status of their 
parents.  What is striking from the table is that children with two remarried parents show a large 
decrease in mean total transfer amount.  Despite the small number of observations, the differences 
in mean amounts between children who have no remarried parents, or children who have only 
remarried mothers, and those children who have two remarried parents are statistically 
significant.   
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Table 3 - Transfers from Parents to Children of Divorced Families  
by Parents’ Remarriage Status 
 
 Transfer 
Received 
Mean 
Amount 
Neither parent remarried 0.236 
n=138 
$1,286 
n=26 
Mother-only remarried 0.343 
n=77 
$1,451 
n=22 
Father-only remarried 0.294 
n=91 
$780 
n=28 
Both parents remarried 0.366 
n=47 
$378 
n=16 
Note: From PSID 1988. Only respondents with 2 living divorced or never-married 
parents who do not co reside with child included.  Weighted by PSID family weight.   
 
 
Of course, simple unconditional means do not provide any evidence that divorce or 
remarriage per se is related to transfers.  There are other differences between intact and divorced 
families which could account for the observed differences in transfers.  These differences are 
described, in part, by the independent variables that appear in the probit, OLS and tobit models.   
 
3.2.3 Independent Variables 
The independent variables included here are, for the most part, those used commonly in 
econometric studies of transfers, with the exception of the variables regarding divorce and 
remarriage (which some authors include and others do not.)   Variables describing the child, or 
transfer recipient, are age, sex, number of natural siblings, number of children, whether the 
individual is black, education level, household income (in logs), parents divorced, father 
remarried and mother remarried.  Variables describing the parents or transfer donors are 
combined income (in logs), joint parental wealth (in logs), distance lived from child, age of 
mother and age of father.  See Appendix C for a more detailed description of these variables.   
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There are significant differences between children from divorced and children from intact 
families.  (See Tables 4a and 4b.) Children of divorced families have lower household incomes 
($20,169 vs. $23,277), they are younger (27.7 years vs. 29.3 years), and they are more likely to be 
black (28% vs. 11%).  They have more siblings on average (3.7 vs. 3.1) and more children in 
their household (.63 vs. .38).  They are also less likely to have a college education.  Their parents 
are younger, less wealthy and have a lower joint income.  (This is robust to exclusion of outliers, 
which are included in the table, but it also reflects the fact that 17 of the 362 children of divorced 
parents report that their father’s income and wealth are unknown.)  
 
Intuitively, one might expect that having younger, less financially well off parents would 
account for the difference in transfer incidence and amount between children of married and non-
married parents.  The multivariate analysis will show that this is not the case.   
 
Table 4a - Summary Characteristics of Unmarried Splitoff Households in PSID 1988 –  
Children’s Characteristics 
 
 
 Intact Divorced All 
 N=531 N=362 N=893 
Child's income* $23,277 
(18,954) 
$20,169 
(17,224) 
$22,283 
(18,466) 
Age*** 29.349 
(6.005) 
27.723 
(5.926) 
28.829 
(6.025) 
Male 0.495 
(0.500) 
0.440 
(0.497) 
0.477 
(0.500) 
# of siblings** 3.135 
(2.459) 
3.714 
(2.903) 
3.320 
(2.622) 
# of children in hh*** 0.378 
(0.819) 
0.634 
(1.089) 
0.461 
(0.921) 
Black*** 0.110 
(0.313) 
0.277 
(0.448) 
0.163 
(0.370) 
High school education* 0.198 
(0.399) 
0.270 
(0.444) 
0.221 
(0.415) 
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More than high school 0.354 
(0.479) 
0.302 
(0.460) 
0.337 
(0.473) 
College education*** 0.268 
(0.443) 
0.151 
(0.358) 
0.230 
(0.421) 
Grad school 0.054 
(0.226) 
0.037 
(0.190) 
0.049 
(0.215) 
Transfer received** 0.377 
(0.485) 
0.292 
(0.455) 
0.350 
(0.477) 
Total dollars received* $1639 
(3328) 
$986 
(1258) 
$1465 
(2934) 
Note: Only children with 2 living parents, who do not co reside with parents included.  Weighted by family weight. 
* indicates significant differences in means at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4b - Summary Characteristics of Unmarried Splitoff Households in PSID 1988 –  
Parents’ Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Only children with 2 living parents, who do not co reside with parents included.  Weighted by family weight. 
* indicates significant differences in means at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 Intact 
N=531 
Divorced 
N=362 
All 
N=893 
Mother remarried 0 
(0) 
0.379 
(0.486) 
0.119 
(0.324) 
Father remarried 0 
(0) 
0.467 
(0.500) 
0.147 
(0.354) 
Joint parental wealth*** $246,223 
(653,368) 
$97,478 
(184,570) 
$198,955 
(553,733) 
Joint parental income $45,695 
(90,723) 
$32,452 
(33,027) 
$41,462 
(77,344) 
Mother's age*** 56.687 
(7.724) 
51.888 
(8.497) 
55.159 
(8.282) 
Father's age*** 59.465 
(8.065) 
53.750 
(9.590) 
57.792 
(8.922) 
Father distance 
unknown*** 
0.001 
(0.037) 
0.198 
(0.399) 
0.064 
(0.245) 
Father < 1 mile*** 0.137 
(0.344) 
0.038 
(0.192) 
0.105 
(0.307) 
Father 1 to 10 miles 0.258 
(0.438) 
0.186 
(0.390) 
0.235 
(0.424) 
Father 11 to 100 miles 0.282 
(0.450) 
0.214 
(0.410) 
0.260 
(0.439) 
Mother distance 
unknown 
0.001 
(0.031) 
0.015 
(0.120) 
0.005 
(0.073) 
Mother < 1 mile 0.138 
(0.345) 
0.143 
(0.350) 
0.139 
(0.347) 
Mother 1 to 10 miles 0.259 
(0.439) 
0.296 
(0.457) 
0.271 
(0.445) 
Mother 11 to 100 miles* 0.284 
(0.451) 
0.216 
(0.412) 
0.262 
(0.440) 
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Table 5a - Summary Characteristics by Parents’ Remarriage Status - 
Children’s Characteristics 
 
 Neither 
N=138 
Mother 
N=77 
Father 
N=91 
Both 
N=47 
Child's income $19,270 
(15,050) 
$16,292 
(12,681) 
$26,681 
(23,102) 
$15,346 
(8,472) 
Age 28.706 
(6.850) 
27.929 
(4.618) 
27.570 
(5.574) 
26.208 
(5.89) 
Male 0.432 
(0.497) 
0.372 
(0.487) 
0.455 
(0.501) 
0.477 
(0.505) 
# of siblings 4.304 
(3.541) 
3.936 
(2.509) 
3.620 
(2.552) 
2.494 
(2.303) 
# of children in hh 0.759 
(1.283) 
0.898 
(1.143) 
0.471 
(0.906) 
0.398 
(0.858) 
Black 0.319 
(0.468) 
0.321 
(0.470) 
0.279 
(0.451) 
0.115 
(0.323) 
High school 
education 
0.186 
(0.390) 
0.177 
(0.384) 
0.346 
(0.478) 
0.376 
(0.490) 
More than high 
school 
0.276 
(0.449) 
0.293 
(0.458) 
0.302 
(0.462) 
0.373 
(0.489) 
College education 0.175 
(0.381) 
0.154 
(0.364) 
0.168 
(0.376) 
0.091 
(0.290) 
Grad school 0.065 
(0.248) 
0.052 
(0.223) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.035 
(0.187) 
Transfer received 0.236 
(0.426) 
0.343 
(0.478) 
0.294 
(0.458) 
0.366 
(0.487) 
Total dollars 
received 
$1,286 
(1,286) 
$1,451 
(1,872) 
$780 
(789) 
$378 
(228) 
Note: Only children with 2 living divorced parents, who do not co reside with parents included.  Weighted by family weight.   
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Table 5b - Summary Characteristics by Parents’ Remarriage Status  
- PSID 1988 – Parents’ Characteristics 
 
 Neither 
N=136 
Mother 
N=77 
Father 
N=91 
Both 
N=47 
Joint parental 
wealth 
$120,803 
(253,237) 
$92,448 
(173,359) 
$94,896 
(143,162) 
$63,979 
(69,791) 
Joint parental 
income 
$25,845 
(29,658) 
$29,636 
(28,090) 
$42,151 
(42,049) 
$33,547 
(24,017) 
Mother's age 55.474 
(8.669) 
51.533 
(7.219) 
49.942 
(8.932) 
48.736 
(6.947) 
Father's age 56.48 
(11.37) 
52.396 
(9.565) 
54.036 
(8.634) 
49.892 
(6.273) 
Father's distance 
unknown 
0.308 
(0.464) 
0.355 
(0.482) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.032 
(0.178) 
Father < 1 mile 0.054 
(0.227) 
0.022 
(0.149) 
0.050 
(0.218) 
0.012 
(0.111) 
Father 1 to 10 miles 0.132 
(0.340) 
0.152 
(0.362) 
0.263 
(0.443) 
0.218 
(0.417) 
Father 11 to 100 
miles 
0.197 
(0.399) 
0.178 
(0.385) 
0.217 
(0.414) 
0.313 
(0.469) 
Mother's distance 
unknown 
0.005 
(0.072) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.045 
(0.207) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Mother < 1 mile 
 
0.131 
(0.339) 
0.125 
(0.333) 
0.220 
(0.416) 
0.063 
(0.246) 
Mother 1 to 10 
miles 
0.333 
(0.473) 
0.278 
(0.451) 
0.187 
(0.392) 
0.356 
(0.484) 
Mother 11 to 100 
miles 
0.241 
(0.429) 
0.304 
(0.463) 
0.168 
(0.375) 
0.171 
(0.381) 
Note: Only children with 2 living divorced parents, who do not co reside with parents included.  Weighted by family weight 
 
 
In looking at the differences among children of divorced parents, conditional on the 
remarriage status of their parents, the only statistically significant differences appear for children 
with two remarried parents.  (See Tables 5a and 5b.) Not only is their transfer incidence and 
amount different, as noted above, but they are younger, poorer, have fewer children and are less 
likely to be black.  They also report fewer siblings than their counterparts with neither or only one 
parent remarried.  This is a strange result, given that a parent’s remarriage is usually correlated 
with more siblings rather than fewer.  In investigating this outcome, I have concluded that the 
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reporting on half-siblings in the PSID is quite inconsistent.  In the questionnaire, respondents are 
asked about natural siblings, but it is clear from examining the data that the reporting of half-
siblings  is entirely random many respondents report them as siblings, but probably more don’t 
report them.  What I believe is happening with this variable is that children with two remarried 
parents have a higher proportion of half-siblings their total sibling count, and given that the 
fraction of half-siblings reported is much less than 1, they are reporting a smaller percentage of 
their siblings than children in the other categories report.   
 
3.3 Multivariate Results 
 
I begin with the estimate of a simple probit model, where the indicator variable equals 1 if a 
transfer has occurred, and 0 otherwise.3 The probit analysis (see Table 6) shows that the 
conditional probability of receiving a transfer does not change with changes in family structure.  
Child’s income, child’s age and parents’ wealth are all significant and show the expected signs.  
Having a college education is significant as well, and all the models I run show that college or 
graduate education is highly correlated with transfers.  In this case, having a college education is 
related to a 16% increase in the probability of a transfer.  There is obviously great potential for 
endogeneity with the education variable.  Children with a higher education are likely to have 
parents who are very willing to invest in their children, and this willingness would certainly lead 
to a higher incidence and amount of transfers. 
 
  
                                                          
3
 The sample used includes many instances of sibling observations.  Sibling observations are unlikely to be 
independent; some components of the unobservables will be highly correlated across siblings.  I use robust standard 
errors with clustering on the family id.   
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Table 6 - Probit - Transfer Probability as Function of the Covariates 
 
 Coefficient dF/dx z-value P>∣z∣ 
Child's household income (ln) -.064* -.021* -1.79 0.074 
Age -.037*** -.012*** -3.13 0.002 
Male .001 .000 0.01 0.994 
# of siblings -.020 -.007 -0.91 0.364 
# of children in household .044 .015 0.80 0.423 
Black -.017 -.006 -0.14 0.892 
High school education -.033 -.011 -0.23 0.821 
More than high school .136 .045 0.91 0.360 
College education .450** .160** 2.40 0.016 
Grad school -.018 -.006 -0.06 0.953 
Parents divorced -.047 -.016 -0.29 0.771 
Mother remarried .187 .064 1.16 0.247 
Father remarried -.004 -.001 -0.02 0.981 
Joint parental income (ln) .025 .008 1.01 0.312 
Joint parental wealth (ln) .055*** .018*** 4.42 0.000 
Father dist unknown -.368 -.110 -1.52 0.128 
Father < 1 mile -.143 -.045 -0.53 0.598 
Father 1 to 10 miles .029 .010 0.15 0.880 
Father 11 to 100 miles -.034 -.011 -0.17 0.861 
Mother distance unknown .208 .073 0.35 0.723 
Mother < 1 mile .156 .053 0.64 0.522 
Mother 1 to 10 miles -.057 -.019 -0.29 0.774 
Mother 11 to 100 miles .044 .015 0.23 0.818 
Father's age -.003 -.001 -0.39 0.696 
Mother's age .001 .000 0.07 0.946 
Constant .504 - 0.93 0.351 
     
Observations 856    
Chi squared 72.2    
Pseudo R-Squared 0.094    
*significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level,*** significant at 1% level  
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Table 7 - OLS Projection - Log Transfer Amount on Covariates 
 
 Coefficient t-value P>∣t∣ 
Child's household income (ln) -.094** -2.18 0.030 
Age -.053** -2.54 0.012 
Male -.052 -0.34 0.734 
# of siblings -.040 -1.44 0.152 
# of children in household .098 1.20 0.232 
Black -.538*** -2.96 0.003 
High school education -.083 -0.38 0.702 
More than high school .304 1.49 0.138 
College education .620** 2.34 0.020 
Grad school 1.404*** 3.32 0.001 
Parents divorced .371** 2.12 0.036 
Mother remarried -.213 -1.01 0.313 
Father remarried -.607*** -2.75 0.007 
Joint parental income (ln) -.020 -0.71 0.479 
Joint parental wealth (ln) .026 1.38 0.168 
Father dist unknown -.287 -0.90 0.371 
Father < 1 mile -.715** -2.00 0.046 
Father 1 to 10 miles -.108 -0.49 0.625 
Father 11 to 100 miles .199 0.84 0.401 
Mother distance unknown -.023 -0.05 0.958 
Mother < 1 mile .358 1.05 0.296 
Mother 1 to 10 miles -.049 -0.22 0.825 
Mother 11 to 100 miles -.109 -0.43 0.669 
Father's age .001 0.07 0.940 
Mother's age .024 1.55 0.122 
Constant 7.21 8.56 0.000 
    
Observations 250   
F(25, 228) 5.98   
R-squared 0.309   
** significant at 5 % level, *** significant at 1% level  
 
 
 
Following the probit analysis, I run an OLS projection of the log of transfer amount (to 
lessen the effect of outliers) on the covariates, for those children who receive a transfer.  
(SeeTable7.) This allows me to explore the correlations seen in the descriptive results further.  
Conditional on receiving a transfer, having divorced parents is significantly correlated with a 
larger transfer; holding all else equal, divorce is correlated with a 37% increase in transfer 
amount.  The positive correlation of divorced parents with transfer amount might be considered 
somewhat counterintuitive, but there are several potential explanations.  One comes from the 
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model: parents’ incomes may be unequal enough that divorce may allow a higher earning parent 
who no longer has to support a lower earning parent to give more to a child than he or she could 
have when supporting a spouse.4  There also could be some gaming behavior on the part of the 
child or parents.  A child might hide the fact that one parent has already given him or her money 
when asking the other parent for money.  Or the parents may compete for the child’s affection 
and attention by each attempting to provide the child with a larger gift.   
 
Remarriage, however, is a different story.  Having a remarried father is correlated with a 
46% decrease in the conditional mean transfer.  This negative correlation is as predicted by the 
model, but the mother’s remarriage is insignificant.  Why would a father’s remarriage matter and 
a mother’s not?  This question is ripe for further study, but a few potential answers come to mind.  
One could be that the altruism parameter for mothers is higher than that for fathers, and a 
stepmother may successfully bargain for her biological children to receive more of a couple’s 
resources, drawing resources away from the stepchildren.  Recall the Case, Lin and McLanahan 
(2000a and 2000b) and Case and Paxson (2001) results, which found that living with a 
stepmother resulted in lowered investments in nutrition, healthcare and education for minor 
children.  Their results provided evidence that there may be a genetic fitness motivation for 
transfers, and that motivation may be driving this result as well.  It also may be that fathers are 
more likely than mothers to have more children after remarrying, and as discussed above, half-
siblings are mis-measured in this survey.  The remarried father coefficient may be picking up the 
effect of more siblings, or of more anticipated future siblings.   
 
                                                          
4
 Running a model which includes the log of the absolute difference between divorced parents’ incomes results in 
divorce being insignificant and the difference in incomes to be significantly positively correlated with transfers.  
(Father’s remarriage remains highly negatively correlated with transfers.)  Doing this, however, means incurring new 
selection effects, because I must drop all those children of divorce for whom one or the other of their parents’  incomes 
are not reported. 
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A third potential reason is based on the assumption that there is an exchange motivation 
for transfers, and it would explain not only the drop in transfers associated with remarriage, but 
the increase associated with divorce.  That explanation goes as follows.  Say that some parents 
give to their children primarily in exchange for future caregiving services.  Because women have 
a longer life expectancy than men, and wives are generally younger than their husbands, they do 
not count on their husbands to be their caregivers when they are elderly.  Thus, they are always 
interested in providing transfers to their children, whether they are married or not, in order to 
ensure these services later in life.  Men, on the other hand, can generally assume their wives will 
be their caregivers because on average their wives are younger and live longer.  When they get 
divorced, however, ensuring caregiving from their children becomes more important, and for that 
reason children’s transfers might increase post-divorce.  The children now have two parents 
attempting to purchase these services.  Once a father’s remarriage takes place (again, for the most 
part, to an even younger wife), the father’s anticipated need for these services disappears, and 
children now have only one parent providing transfers in exchange for future services.   
 
The other significant covariates that are negatively correlated with transfer amount are 
child’s income, age, being black and having the father live within a mile of the child.  Having a 
college or graduate level education is positively correlated with transfer amount.  Parent’s income 
and wealth are both insignificant.   
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Table 8 - Tobit - Log Transfer Amount 
 
 Coefficient z-value P>∣z∣ 
Child's household income (ln) -.145** -2.36 0.018 
Age -.095*** -3.88 0.000 
Male .011 0.05 0.960 
# of siblings -.065* -1.65 0.098 
# of children in household .135 1.22 0.221 
Black -.260 -1.00 0.315 
High school education -.057 -0.19 0.849 
More than high school .425 1.45 0.146 
College education 1.164*** 3.18 0.001 
Grad school .572 0.88 0.380 
Parents divorced .057 .018 0.857 
Mother remarried .194 0.59 0.554 
Father remarried -.252 -0.72 0.474 
Joint parental income (ln) .021 0.47 0.640 
Joint parental wealth (ln) .119*** 4.63 0.000 
Father dist unknown -.875* -1.82 0.069 
Father < 1 mile -.615 -1.19 0.236 
Father 1 to 10 miles .030 0.08 0.936 
Father 11 to 100 miles .004 0.01 0.992 
Mother distance unknown .320 0.28 0.776 
Mother < 1 mile .467 1.01 0.314 
Mother 1 to 10 miles -.128 -0.33 0.739 
Mother 11 to 100 miles .048 0.12 0.902 
Father's age .000 0.02 0.983 
Mother's age .008 0.36 0.716 
Constant 5.89*** 5.59 0.000 
    
Observations 856   
Uncensored obs 246   
Censored obs 610   
Number of groups 632   
Wald chi-squared (25) 106.27   
Var. of family comp. of error 0.869   
Var. of overall comp. of error 1.92   
*significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5 % level, *** significant at 1% level  
 
Finally, I run a selection-corrected model, using random-effects tobit5.  (See Table 8.) 
Like the probit, the tobit regression shows no correlation between divorce or remarriage and the 
transfer amount.  Child’s income, child’s age, number of siblings, and not knowing the 
                                                          
5
 Random effects is used to correct for correlation of errors among sibling groups.   
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whereabouts of the father are all correlated with lower transfers.  Having a college education is 
strongly correlated with higher transfers, increasing expected transfer amount by over 200%.  An 
increase in the parents’ joint wealth is also correlated with higher transfers, but this relationship is 
very weak.  A 1% increase in parents’ wealth is correlated with a 0.12% increase in the amount of 
a transfer.  At the means of wealth and transfer amount, these percentages correspond to about 
$2000 and $0.61, respectively.  The coefficient for the log of the child’s income reveals a 
similarly weak (negative) relationship.   
 
While the divorce and remarriage variables are insignificant in the selection-corrected 
model, it is worth discussing the appearance of “father’s distance unknown” as a significant 
negatively related covariate because it is almost a perfect predictor of divorce.  Not knowing the 
whereabouts of one’s father is related to a 63% drop in total transfer amount and almost 20% of 
the children of divorced parents fall into this category.  In contrast, only 0.1% of the children of 
married parents report not knowing where their father lives.  Also, in contrast, only 1.5% of the 
children of divorced parents report not knowing where their mother lives.   
 
 
While this variable is endogenous (a father’s lack of contact with his child is certainly 
correlated with unobservables that affect transfers) it may actually be an observable case of the 
most extreme of the unobservables often associated with divorce - the father’s disengagement 
from the child.  It is, after all, the variable that declares “no relationship.”  The propensity to 
disengage from children may well exist in fathers in married parent couples as well, but only in 
the divorced state does this tendency have the opportunity to be observed.  In married couples the 
disinterest of a father may be masked by the mother, or the mother may put great effort into 
keeping a potentially disinterested father engaged and contributing financially to their child.  
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Divorce may not have a direct relationship with transfers for the population as a whole, but it 
enables us to observe how a lack of relationship between fathers and their children correlates with 
lower total transfers.  Mothers do not or cannot make up for what the fathers in these cases do not 
provide.   
4.  Conclusion 
The dynamics of transfers to adult children suggest that the effect of parental divorce on 
transfers may be different for adult children than for minors.  A simple model with altruistic 
parents or stepparents bargaining over the transfer to an adult child or step child demonstrates that 
divorce may actually impact the total transfer amount received by a child positively, if at all, prior 
to a parent’s remarriage.  Once remarriage takes place, however, the model shows how the impact 
of bargaining between biological parents and stepparents, combined with a lower level of altruism 
on the part of stepparents toward stepchildren, results in lowered total transfer inflows to the 
child.   
 
Empirical examination of the issue is complicated by the endogeneity of divorce and 
remarriage-the correlation of divorce and remarriage with unobserved characteristics on the part 
of the parents that may affect transfers.  Ideally, valid instruments could be used to represent 
these variables, but finding instruments for three highly correlated endogenous variables was 
unfeasible.  Therefore, the causality of divorce and remarriage on transfers is not addressed here.  
Looking at conditional probabilities, the empirical evidence suggests that divorce and remarriage 
are uncorrelated with the probability of a receiving a transfer from either parent.  They are also 
uncorrelated with the total transfer amount, when selection effects are corrected.  For the child 
that receives a transfer, however, the marital status variables are significantly correlated with the 
overall amount of the transfer.  Divorce is correlated with higher transfer amounts, while a 
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father’s remarriage is correlated with lower.  Why does the father’s remarriage seem to matter 
and not the mother’s?  This paper does not attempt to answer this question, but the question could 
shed light not only on the economic nature of remarriage, but on the underlying motivations for 
transfers themselves.   
 
For example, the answer may lie in different levels of maternal and paternal altruism 
toward children, or in the motivation of stepmothers to divert resources to their own biological 
children.  Both of these explanations might support a genetic fitness motivation for transfers.  Or, 
the dichotomy could be due to different expectations on the part of remarried mothers vs.  
remarried fathers regarding the help they expect to need from their children as they age, 
supporting an exchange motivation for transfers.  There are, of course, many other potential 
explanations.  Given the trends in divorce and remarriage, it may be good news to see evidence 
that the economic consequences of divorce (measured simply in terms of financial support 
provided by parents) are mitigated by children entering adulthood.  But given the numbers of 
children who will be experiencing life with a stepparent, whether or not remarriage affects 
support for adult children from prior marriages requires more examination.  Young adults who 
might otherwise be able to expect significant support from their parents may see their total 
inflows decline as their fathers, in particular, take on new spouses.   
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Appendix A - Derivations  
 
A.1 Baseline - The Intact Family 
 
As described in section 2.2, the parents' utility functions are:  
 
 
ln ln lnf m f m kU U c c cα= = + +  (22) 
 
and the resource constraints are:  
 f m f m kI I c c T+ = + +  (23) 
 
and  
 k k kc I T= +  (24) 
where If, Im and Ik are the endowment incomes of the father, mother and  child, and Tk represents 
the parents’ transfer to the child.   
 
The Nash bargaining solution results from the maximization of the Lagrangian:  
 
 
( , , , ) ( )( ) ( ) Div Divm f k m m f f f m m f kL c c T U U U U I I c c Tλ λ= − − + + − − −  (25) 
 
where   and Div Divm fU U denote the utility of the mother and father in the divorced state, or the 
threat points.   
 
By assuming that the parents weight their own and their spouse’s consumption equally, 
the bargaining question becomes a trivial one: regardless of the values of the threat points, the 
problem simplifies to a maximization of the shared utility function subject to the budget 
constraint.  Solving for the utility maximizing consumption allocations results in the following 
parental consumption, transfer and child consumption levels:  
 
2
f m kInt Int
f m
I I I
c c
α
+ +
= =
+
 (26) 
 
( ) 2
2
f m kInt
k
I I I
T
α
α
+ −
=
+
 (27) 
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( )
2
f m kInt
k
I I I
c
α
α
+ +
=
+
 (28) 
 
where the superscript Int denotes the intact family state.   
 
A positive transfer occurs to the child as long as:  
 
 
( )
2
f m
k
I I
I
α +
<
 (29) 
 
A.2 Divorced Parents with Traditional Child Support  
 
It is interesting to note that in the case of divorced parents of minor children, using 
traditional child support, this model reflects the outcome that has been empirically documented 
by so many namely, that transfers from noncustodial parents to the child (through the custodial 
parent) drop significantly post-divorce.  Child support payments (the transfers) are made from the 
noncustodial parent to the custodial parent who spends it according to her discretion.  The results 
of this case support the intuition that one of the problems with the traditional method of child-
support for minors is the indirect nature of the parent’s contribution to the child.  Non-custodial 
parents, usually fathers, have no control over how their transfer is used, or whether it is going 
toward the child’s consumption, versus the mother’s.  Depending upon the level of animosity 
between the parents, as well as the geographical distance which makes monitoring even more 
difficult, the willingness of fathers to provide a transfer may virtually disappear.   
 
The game modeled here is a Stackelberg-type game, which is solved using backward 
induction.  Assume that the mother is the custodial parent, and the father is the non-custodial 
parent.  The father is not able to affect his child’s consumption directly through his transfer.  
Instead, he transfers an amount to the mother and then observes how she optimally divides her 
total resources (income plus the transfer) between her consumption and her child’s.  Once he 
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knows how his transfer affects the child’s consumption, he can then optimally choose his utility 
maximizing transfer.   
 
The mother’s best response levels of  and csm kc T (where cs indicates “child support” ) are 
found by maximizing:  
 
 ln lnm m kU c cα= +  (30) 
subject to the resource constraints:  
 
 
f cs
m m kI T c T+ = +  (31) 
and  
 
 
cs
k k kc I T= +  (32) 
with the overbar indicating that the mother takes the father’s transfer as given.  The best response 
level of Tkcs(and therefore the child’s total transfer) is:  
 
( )
(1 )
f
cs m k
k
I T IT α
α
+ −
=
+
 (33) 
which means that the child’s consumption is:  
 
 
( )
(1 )
f
m k
k
I T I
c
α
α
+ +
=
+
 (34) 
 
Knowing this best response function, the father determines his optimal levels of cf and Tf by 
maximizing:  
 
 
 
ln lnf f kU c cα= +  (35) 
subject to:  
 
 
f
f fI c T= +  (36) 
and equation (34).  I shall also impose the non-negativity constraint: 0fT ≥ . The resulting 
optimal transfer fT  is:  
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 (1 )
f k mf I I IT
α
α
− −
=
+
 (37) 
Substituting back into the mother's best response transfer, I find the total transfer to the child cskT
is: 
 
2
2
( ) (1 2 )
(1 )
m f kcs
k
I I I
T
α α
α
+ − +
=
+
 (38) 
 
Note that a transfer from the father only takes place if ( ) /f k mI I I α> + .   
 
Subtracting cskT (38) from intkT (27) shows that transfers in the intact, married parents state 
are always greater.   
 
A.3 Case 1 – Divorce with Direct Transfers, 
 
Based on the setup described in Section 2.3, the father’s maximization problem is 
represented by the Lagrangian:  
 ( )( , , ) ln ln( % )f m f ff f k f fL c T c I T T I c Tλ α λ= + + + + − −  (39) 
 
The first order conditions are:  
 
1
:f
f
c
c
λ=
 (40) 
 
 :f
m f
k
T
I T T
α
λ=
+ +
 (41) 
 
 
: ff fI c Tλ = +  (42) 
 
Equating the FOC’s for cf and Tf to get the expression for cf in terms of Tf and then 
substituting into the FOC for I can solve for Tf to obtain the best response function for father’s 
transfers:  
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1
m
f kf
BR
I I T
T
α
α
− −
=
+
 (43) 
 
Because the problem is symmetric, the mother’s Best Response will be:  
 
 
1
f
m m k
BR
I I TT α
α
− −
=
+
 (44) 
 
Substituting the mother’s Best Response into the father’s, I arrive at the Nash Equilibrium 
transfer levels:  
 
 
(1 ) ( )
2
f k mf I I IT
α
α
+ − +
=
+
 (45) 
 
 
(1 ) ( )
2
m k fm I I IT
α
α
+ − +
=
+
 (46) 
the total transfer to the child:  
 
 
( ) 2
2
f m kDiv f m
k
I I I
T T T
α
α
+ −
= + =
+
 (47) 
the consumption levels:  
 
 
( )
2
f m kDiv f m
k k
I I I
c T T I
α
α
+ +
= + + =
+
 (48) 
 
 
( )
2
f m kDiv Div f m
f m f m
I I I
c c I T I T
α
+ +
= = − = − =
+
 (49) 
 
and the parents’ utility levels:  
 
 
( ) ( )
ln ln
2 2
f m k f m kDiv Div
m f
I I I I I I
U U
α
α
α α
+ + + +   
= = +   + +   
 (50) 
 
 
(1 )[ln( ) ln(2 )] lnf m kI I Iα α α α= + + + − + +  (51) 
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A.4 Divorce With Highly Unequal Parental Earnings  
 
Take the mother’s equilibrium transfer equation from Appendix A.3 (46).  A positive 
transfer will only result if ( ) / (1 )m f kI I I α> + + .  If the mother’s income is less than or equal 
to this amount, no transfer from her takes place.  In that case, at equilibrium, the father substitutes 
a 0 into his best response function (43) resulting in a total transfer of  
 
1
f kDiv
f
I I
T
α
α
−
=
+
 (52) 
 
How does this compare with the transfer the child would receive if his parents were 
married?  The child’s transfer will be higher in the intact state as long as subtracting the transfer 
under divorce (52) from the transfer under an intact regime (27) results in a positive number.   
 
2Int Div
f f m m kT T I I I Iα α α α− = − + + −  (53) 
 
which is greater than zero iff:  
 
1
f k
m
I I
I
α
+
>
+
 (54) 
 
This, however, is precisely the condition that was violated in the equilibrium transfer 
equation for the mother, resulting in only the father giving a transfer.  Therefore, as long as the 
mother’s income is so low that in the divorced state the mother does not provide a transfer, the 
child’s transfer amount increases following a divorce.   
 
  
52 
 
A.5 Case 2 - Remarried Parents  
 
Based on the setup described in section 2.4,  F12 determines its optimal consumption 
levels through Nash bargaining between m1 and f2;taking the transfer from F21 as given.  The best 
response functions from the two families then determine the Nash-Cournot equilibrium transfers.  
The Lagrangian is a function of 12 121 2 1 2, , , and m fc c T T λ . 
 
12 21 12 21
1 2 1 1 2 2 1
12 21 12 21
1 2 2 2 1 1 2
12 12
1 2 1 2
ln ln ln( ) ln( % )
ln ln ln( % ) ln( ) %
( )
Div
m f k k m
Div
m f k k f
f m m f
L c c I T T I T T U
c c I T T I T T U
I I c c T T
α γ
α γ
λ
 = + + + + + + + −
 
 + + + + + + + −
 
+ + − − − −
 
 
Solving for the first-order conditions, assuming a symmetric solution,
12 12 21 21
1 2 1 2 1 2,  ,  m fc c T T T T= = = and keeping in mind the equal threat points, 1 2
Div Div
m fU U=  
results in:  
 
 
12 21
1 1 1 1 1
1
2
: 2ln ( ) ln( ) Divm m k m
m
c c I T T U
c
α γ λ + + + + − =
   (55) 
 
 
12 12 21
1 1 1 1 112 21
1 1
: 2 ln ( ) ln( ) Divm k m
k
T c I T T U
I T T
α γ
α γ λ
+  + + + + − =
 + +
 (56) 
 
This implies that:  
 
 
12 21
1 1
1
2( )k
m
T T I
c
α γ
+ +
=
+
 (57) 
 
Substituting into the FOC for λ (the budget constraint) allows us to solve for F12’s best response 
transfers to child one (and therefore also to child two):  
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21
112
1
( )( ) 4 4
4 2( )
f m kI I T IT
α γ
α γ
+ + − −
=
+ +
 (58) 
 
This implies that the best response for F21 is:  
 
 
12
121
1
( )( ) 4 4
4 2( )
f m kI I T IT
α γ
α γ
+ + − −
=
+ +
 (59) 
 
This can be solved using substitution for the Nash-Cournot equilibrium transfers:  
 
 
12 21
1 1
( )( ) 4
2(4 ))
f m kI I IT T
α γ
α γ
+ + −
= =
+ +
 (60) 
and total transfers to the child:  
 
 
2
1
( )( ) 4
(4 )
f m kRem I I IT
α γ
α γ
+ + −
=
+ +
 (61) 
which implies that:  
 
 
( )
2
1
( )( )
4
f m kRem
k
I I I
c
α γ
α γ
+ + +
=
+ +
 (62) 
 
The parents’ consumption is found simply by substituting the transfer amounts into the budget 
constraint, keeping in mind that 1 2m fc c= . 
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Appendix B - Endogeneity of Divorce  
 
A critical problem for any researcher attempting to quantify the effects of divorce on 
children and families is the endogeneity of the variable.  That is, there are certain unobservable 
characteristics of parents and families who experience divorce (or never-marriage) that are also 
causal in the outcomes the researchers are studying, be they behavioral, social or economic.  One 
could say, in the spirit of Willis & Rosen (1979) that in this study of transfer behavior there is an 
underlying selection process that is taking place, dividing the studied group into divorced and 
intact families, and that the process that drives the selection also affects the amount of transfers 
children receive.  It could be modeled in the following way.   
 
The transfer equation I want to estimate is:  
 1 1 1DY X Dβ β ε= + +  
where Y is the transfers amount , X1 is the vector of observable parent and child characteristics, D 
is a binary variable indicating if the parents are divorced and ε1  are the unobservables that 
comprise the error term.  (For simplicity’s sake, I will not include the other selection process, that 
of selection into the receiving group vs.  the non-receiving group, in this analysis.)  
 
Underlying this transfers outcome is the process which determines whether the parents 
are divorced or not.  Let’s say we observe divorce, D=1, if D*>0,where  
 2 2 2D X β ε
∗ = +  
and X2 is the vector of observable parent characteristics (which will certainly have variables in 
common with X1 but would need to have at least one variable appearing in X2  that does not 
appear in X1) and ε2 are the unobservables comprising the divorce error term.   
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Certainly ε1,and ε2  would be correlated, and most likely this correlation would be 
negative.  For example, selfishness in parents would make divorce more likely and transfers to 
children lower.  Promiscuity on the part of a parent would make divorce more likely, and might 
lower transfers because of the financial resources invested in other partners.  There could be some 
positive correlation as well, if, for example, a particularly needy parent drives their spouse away 
and uses money to buy attention from their children.   
 
In any case, D is correlated with ε2 and thus is correlated with ε1 violating a key condition 
for OLS: 1[ | ] 0.E Dε =  So, the transfers regression would be picking up both the direct, causal 
effect of divorce on transfers, the Dβ  that I want to estimate, and the expected value of the error 
term given that the parents are divorced.  The conditional expectation for ε1 in this case is defined 
as 1 2 2 2[ | ]E Xε ε β> −  if the parents are divorced, or 1 2 2 2[ | ].E Xε ε β≤ −  
 
If I were to estimate both equations in this model, I could potentially correct for this.  My 
transfer equation would then become  
 1 1 1 2[ (1 )]DY X D D Dλβ β β λ λ η= + + + − +  
with the λ terms coming from the first stage divorce estimation.  If I assume that the error terms 
are normally distributed, the λ terms are:  
 [ ]1 2 2 2 2 2 2( / ) / 1 ( / )X Xλ φ β σ β σ= − −Φ −  
 
 [ ]2 2 2 2 2 2 2( / ) / ( / )X Xλ φ β σ β σ= − − Φ −  
The  λβ would give us the estimate of 12 2/σ σ where 12σ is the covariance of the error 
terms and 2σ is the standard deviation of  2 .ε   The non-correlated part of the error term is 
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represented by η.  This discrete endogenous variable model is basically a simplified version of the 
more general approach taken in Willis & Rosen (1979).   
 
In this paper, and in most of the papers dealing with the outcome of divorce, modeling of 
the divorce process falls outside the scope of the paper.  One paper that takes this approach, 
however, is Manski, et al (1992) in which they use a trivariate probit model to jointly explain 
high school graduation and family structure outcomes using educational heterogamy, or the 
incidence of a mother’s education level being higher than the father’s, as one of their 
exclusionary restrictions in the family structure regression.  (They find this binary variable to be 
positively correlated with the incidence of divorce, and I attempt to exploit this correlation 
below.) Manski, et al (1992) find that divorce is causal in lowering the likelihood of high school 
graduation.   
 
 
B.1 Other Approaches  
There are various other approaches to controlling for the endogeneity of divorce.  One 
rather common method is to use a continuous variable, time spent with a biological parent present 
in the household during childhood, as the treatment, instead of the binary divorce variable.  Then 
one can compare children in the same family, who in the case of divorce, will have spent different 
amounts of time co-residing with the parent, and use fixed effects to control for family 
unobservables.  This approach is particularly popular in the sociological literature.  Lang and 
Zagorsky (2000) and Sandefur and Wells (1997) are both good examples of this approach.  
Sandefur and Wells (1997) find statistically significant effects of family structure on educational 
outcome, although the magnitude is lower than in studies that do not control for family 
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unobservables.  Lang and Zagorsky(2000) find that in most of their measures of adult economic 
well being, parental presence in childhood does not have an impact.   
 
Lang and Zagorsky (2000) also compare the separation from parents caused by divorce 
(or other causes) to the separation caused by a more exogenous source of variation: death of a 
parent.  Corak (2001) uses this approach as well.  By comparing the two they attempt to show the 
degree of endogeneity of non-death separation.  Lang and Zagorsky (2000) find almost no adult 
outcomes that are affected differently by death (except marital prospects for sons).  Corak (2001) 
finds a high degree of endogeneity of divorce.   
 
Another approach employs panel data to do pre-divorce and post-divorce analysis.  
Painter and Levine (2000) use pre- and post-divorce measures of children’s economic, 
educational and teenage fertility outcomes to determine if divorce and remarriage are causal or 
simply correlates.  Using data from the National Educational Longitudinal Survey of 1988, they 
compare to-be-divorced children with to-remain-intact children before and at the end of  
their high school years.  For the most part, they find that the individuals in to-be-divorced 
families were not significantly different in income to needs ratios or in eighth-grade test scores 
than their peers in families that remained intact.  This leads the authors to conclude that their 
differences post-divorce are causal results of divorce.   
 
Finally, there is the instrumental variable approach.  Identifying a suitable instrument is 
extremely difficult.  As stated by Jonathan Gruber (2000), “What is required to appropriately 
identify the impacts of divorce is an exogenous instrument that causes some families to divorce 
and others not, based on a factor independent of the determinants of their children’s outcomes.  
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No previous study has been able to uncover such an instrument, making it somewhat hard to 
interpret causally this large literature.” (p. 10)  
 
The instrument that is most often relied upon, however, is the adoption of unilateral 
divorce, or occasionally no-fault divorce.  Unilateral divorce laws allow a divorce to take place 
even if one spouse objects to the divorce.  These laws were enacted by a majority of states during 
the 1970’s and early 1980’s and so they supply a source of seemingly exogenous variation.6  (No-
fault laws refer to either no-fault divorce, whereby no transgression on the part of the spouse is 
required to be proven, or to no-fault divorce settlements, in which fault is not taken into account 
in the division of marital property.  These laws were largely implemented from the 1950’s to the 
early 1970’s.)  
 
There have been contradictory findings regarding the correlation between unilateral 
divorce laws and divorce rates.  Peters (1986) using cross-sectional data determined that women 
in unilateral divorce states were no more likely to be divorced than women in mutual consent 
states.  Friedberg (1998) found a positive effect of unilateral divorce on divorce rates using panel 
data, although Wolfers (2003) argues that the effect on divorce rates was a) short term, and b) 
endogenous as far as divorce trends in the states were already concerned.  Gruber (2000) finds a 
highly significant impact of unilateral divorce on the likelihood of being divorced.   
 
Gruber also points out, however, that there are other channels through which unilateral 
divorce affects child outcomes, including through decreasing the rate of separation vs. divorce, 
through increasing rates of marriage and through changing the bargaining power within marriage.  
                                                          
6
 This variation would be less than exogenous if it reflected divorce trends already existent in the state, and resulted 
from some growing demand for divorce, as is claimed by Wolfers (2003).   
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For these reasons he claims that unilateral divorce laws are not an appropriate instrument for 
divorce.   
 
Antecol & Bedard (2007) and Fertig (2004) use unilateral or no-fault divorce as an 
instrument not for divorce per se, but for the time spent living with a parent in childhood.  
Antecol & Bedard (2007) use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to examine 
the effect of family structure on teenage drug use, crime and promiscuity.  They use the number 
of years since age 21 that the mother has lived in a state with unilateral divorce laws to instrument 
for the number of months that the biological father lived with the child.  They are satisfied that 
they have a relevant instrument because at the first stage the instrument is always individually 
significant at the one percent level, with the first stage F-statistics falling between 8 and 11, 
depending upon the youth behavior being estimated.   
 
Fertig (2004) instruments for years spent with a biological father present using a child’s 
years of exposure to no-fault divorce.  Her study used data from the core sample of the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics, examining children born between 1948 and 1968.  (She uses at least 
one of the parent’s marriage history files to determine the years of parental presence.  It is not 
clear how she determined states of residence prior to 1968, the first year of the PSID.) Fertig 
determines that the first-stage coefficients for the instrument behave appropriately and the first-
stage F-statistic is 16.17.   
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B.2 Applicability to This Paper  
 
As stated above, modeling the underlying divorce process is outside the bounds of this 
study, and longitudinal  approaches to controlling for family unobservables are not feasible given 
that key elements of the data are from a one-year Time and Transfers Supplement to the PSID.   
 
It might be possible to take the approach of Lang and Zagorsky (2000) and others, to use 
not divorce, but time spent in childhood living with one or both parents and control for family 
unobservables using siblings.  My sample, however, is of adults whose parents may well have 
split up after the children were grown.  Also, I am interested in the relationship between transfers 
and divorce per se, and not death, military absences or temporary separations.  Examining how 
co-residence with parents in childhood is related to transfers later in life could be an interesting 
question for another paper, however.  (It is also true that using the retrospective marital history 
files of the parents of the sample members to construct these measures would have forced me to 
severely limit my sample size due to the incomplete nature of those files.)  
 
This leaves me with the instrumental variables approach.  First, as stated in the body of 
the paper, I not only have to instrument for divorce, but at the same time instrument for father’s 
and mother’s remarriage.  This is not feasible, but just for the sake of argument, let’s say I drop 
the other endogenous variables (mother’s remarriage, father’s remarriage, AND, not knowing the 
whereabouts of the father or mother which also perfectly predict divorce) and only look at 
divorce.   
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A suitable instrumental variable is one that is both relevant, meaning correlated with the 
endogenous variable7, and exogenous, meaning uncorrelated with the error term. Various papers 
have used unilateral or no-fault divorce, as already mentioned.  Upon the suggestions of 
colleagues, I have tried various other instruments, none of which have previously been shown in 
the literature to be suitable.  Religiosity, for example, was shown unrelated to the increase in 
divorce rate when analyzed together with the adoption of no-fault divorce.  (Nakonezny, Shull 
and Rodgers, 1995)  
 
In this data set, however, a suitable variable may exist.  I attempt to use several, including 
the implementation of unilateral divorce laws8, the implementation of no-fault divorce laws9, non-
membership in the Catholic church10 degree of church attendance11, whether the first-born child 
of the mother of the family was female and educational heterogamy12 as defined by Manski, et al 
(1992).   
 
For my sample (unmarried heads of household with at least one parent who is also a 
PSID sample member), I find the following correlations:  
 
Correlation Divorced parents 
Years in unilateral state 0.117 
Years in no-fault state -0.055 
Non-catholic 0.144 
                                                          
7
 Stock and Watson (2002) suggest a rule of thumb for a relevant instrument to be an F-statistic of at least 10 in the 
first-stage regression.  (Chapter 10.) 
8
 The number of years that the family would have lived in a unilateral state by 1988 assuming they stayed in their state 
of residence in 1968. 
9
 The number of years that the family would have lived in a no-fault state by 1988 assuming they stayed in their state 
of residence in 1968.   
10
 The family’s religion is first asked in the PSID in 1970.  Being a self-described non-Catholic in 1970 is the 
variable. 
11
 Asked first in the PSID in 1970, this variable describes levels of church attendance from 1-lowest  to 3-highest.   
12
 Mother’s level of education> father’s level of education.   
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Religious attendance -0.089 
Educational heterogamy -0.083 
 
Because I am instrumenting for a dichotomous endogenous variable within an OLS 
regression, I use the CDSIMEQ command in Stata (documented in Keshk, 2003).  The only 
instrument that I find to have significance in the first stage probit regression is the years lived in a 
no-fault state.  This is somewhat curious, given that its correlation is the lowest of all the 
variables I tried.  In the second stage the instrumented variable for divorce is insignificant, (with a 
positive coefficient, however) indicating that it has no effect on the transfer amount for those who 
receive a transfer. The insignificance is not surprising given that standard errors in two-stage 
models are very high.  I only include this result as an exploration of potential instrumental 
variables, as I believe the true model must include the remarriage variables.  Given the lack of 
control for unobserved family characteristics, the empirical results for divorce and remarriage in 
this paper must be viewed as correlations only, not as evidence of causality.   
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Appendix C -  Description of the Variables  
 
Child/Transfer Recipient 
 
age 
sex: takes value of 1 if male  
siblings: number of natural siblings reported by respondent.  See discussion  of the reporting of 
half-siblings in Section 3.2.3.   
children in the household: the number of children living with the child/transfer recipient.  
Ideally, the number of the recipient’s biological children would be used, but there was too 
much missing information in the PSID Individual file to determine how many biological 
children the recipient had in 1988.   
black: takes value of 1 if recipient is black  
education: less than high school, high school, some college, college, and grad school  
household income (ln): includes all wages, labor and non-labor income (excluding family 
transfers) for head and other household members.   
parents divorced: takes a value of 1 if the biological parents of the child are divorced or never-
married.  The basic questionnaire for the PSID does not ask specifically about parental 
divorce, only whether parents are married to each other or not.  Using data from the 
Marriage History file, I can determine if a divorce occurred or not, but only if the 
marriage existed during the years of the PSID.  This reduces the number of observations 
by about 250 and changes the characteristics of the data set quite significantly.  Here I 
will assume that divorce and non-marriage have similar effects.   
father remarried: takes a value of 1 if father is remarried  
mother remarried: takes a value of 1 if mother is remarried  
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Parents/Transfer Donors:  
joint parental income(ln): sum of all wages, labor, and non-labor income for the father and 
mother of the head.  Usually this data is reported by the parent him or herself, but when it 
is not, (for example, when the parents are divorced and only the mother of the head is 
surveyed in the PSID), I use the child’s report of the parent’s income  if available.  When 
the child reports a range for the income, the midpoint of that range is ascribed.  When the 
child reports an income for his remarried parent and stepparent, the parent is ascribed 
one-half of the couple’s income.   
joint parental wealth(ln): for married parents, this variable is taken first from their self-reported 
net worth, and when that is missing, from the child’s report of the parent’s net worth.  In 
cases where the exact amount was unknown, but a range was reported, I ascribed the 
midpoint of the range as the net worth.  For remarried parents, I used half of the reported 
net worth for the remarried couple, as the PSID lumps a couple’s assets together.   
distance from child: indicator variables for ranges of distance (less than mile, 1 to 10 miles, 10 to 
100 miles, over 100 miles, or unknown)  
age: mother’s age and father’s age are included.  The father’s age is missing in about 100 of the 
observations.  These missing observations are correlated with those cases where parents 
are divorced.  In order to include these observations, I imputed missing mother’s and 
father’s age data by taking the mean difference between the age of fathers and mothers in 
the sample, and the mean difference between the age of fathers, mothers and children in 
the sample.  If mother’s age was available, I added the mean difference to her age to 
impute the father’s age.  If both mother’s and father’s ages were missing, I added the 
mean difference to the child’s age.  All results are robust to dropping the imputed 
observations.   
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Chpater 2 - The Correlation Between Subjective Parental 
Longevity and Intergenerational Transfers 
 
1.  Introduction13 
Is there any correlation between a parent’s subjective longevity and financial transfers 
given to adult children?  Are trends in longevity at all correlated with actual transfers, anticipated 
bequests or anticipated inter vivos transfers? 
The trends in longevity are clear. The life expectancy for American men and women aged 
55 increased by around 15% between 1960 and 1990. (Wise, 1997).  The US Census Bureau 
(2002) predicts that life expectancy at birth will increase from 77 years for men in 2002 to 81 
years for men in 2025, and from 80 to 84 for women over the same timeframe.     
While this paper does not attempt to pin down any causal relationship between subjective 
longevity and transfers, it is important to understand the patterns observed in the data because of 
the implications for related issues in family economics.  For example, if the data were to show 
that parents who expected to live longer consistently gave less to their children than parents who 
expected shorter life spans, that might lead us to consider the implications for intra-family elder 
care. Transfers are strongly correlated with the services rendered by children to elderly parents14, 
so if the group that will be living longer is giving less, there could be implications for the plans 
the United States must put in place to deal with the explosive growth of the elderly population 
                                                          
13
 Many thanks to Professors Donald Cox and Peter Gottschalk of Boston College and Professor Kathleen McGarry of 
UCLA for their comments and advice.  Thanks also to Professor I-Fen Lin of Bowling Green State Univerisity for her 
comments on this paper as a discussant at the Population Association of America Conference, 2009. 
14
 The positive correlation between past financial transfers to children and caregiving provided to elderly parents is 
shown by Henretta, et al (1997) and Koh and MacDonald (2006). 
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over the next 40 years.15  Though these policy implications cannot be addressed in this paper, 
they provide motivation for the question and are a logical next step this research could take. 
Another motivation for this study is the observed gender difference in giving to adult 
children among divorced and remarried mothers and fathers, found in Way (2009).  That paper 
found that the remarriage of divorced fathers is correlated with a large decrease in giving to 
children of a prior marriage, holding all else equal.  The different life expectancies for men and 
women could potentially provide a part of the explanation for the observed differences in giving, 
so finding the correlations between SSP and giving are part of a broader research agenda to better 
understand issues of gender, family structure and intergenerational transfers. 
 To date, no research has examined subjective longevity and intergenerational transfer 
behavior.  Very few papers have used data on “subjective survival probability” (or a person’s own 
estimate of their probability of achieving a given age, hereinafter referred to as “SSP”), for any 
empirical study.  Longevity is obviously crucial to certain theoretical models, such as lifecycle 
models of consumption and savings. Actuarial life tables have been employed by many 
economists in estimating these and other types of models.  There are studies showing that people 
with reasons to expect a shorter lifespan, such as poor health, increase their consumption levels 
(Lillard and Weiss, 1997).  Another branch of the literature has looked at increases in longevity 
and the demand for nursing home care and other types of elder care.  But none of these studies 
have asked how parental expectations of lifespan might be correlated with whether or not, and 
how much, they give to their children. 
This paper provides a first descriptive step in answering this question.  It very simply 
documents the stylized facts for a select group of unmarried older parents to determine whether 
                                                          
15
 The population of Americans aged 65 and older is expected to increase from 35 milllion in 2000 to over 80 million in 
2050. (Knickman and Snell, 2002) 
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any correlations exist between subjective life expectancy and transfers made in the past or 
anticipated in the future.  To do this it takes advantage of a unique question in the Health and 
Retirement Study - “What are the chances that you will live to be age 85 or more?”  - and uses 
data on actual transfers given and future anticipated bequests and transfers to uncover the trends.  
The sample used is a select subset of parents, consisting of unmarried (widowed, divorced or 
never-married) mothers and fathers.  This subset is used in order to avoid confounding transfers 
from married couples to their children, but the results of the paper must be interpreted in light of 
the unique characteristics of the sample. 
What I find is that while there are modest unconditional positive correlations between 
subjective survival probability and the incidence and amount of transfers given by mothers, 
conditioning on other key covariates such as income, education and health results in no 
meaningful correlation between these variables for mothers or fathers.  I also find that: 
1) There are both unconditional and conditional positive correlations between 
subjective survival probability and the likelihood of giving a large transfer or 
bequest in the future for mothers. 
2) While there are unconditional correlations for fathers between subjective 
survival probability and the likelihood of future transfers and bequests, 
conditioning upon other covariates results in no correlation for bequests, and a 
non-linear relationship between SSP and future inter vivos transfers. 
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3) In addition to these differences, there are other gender differences in the patterns 
of giving between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers that point to 
interesting avenues for future research. 
In the following section, I will review what is known subjective survival probability and 
economic behavior.  Next, I will provide some of the intuition for thinking about the potential 
channels through which subjective longevity and transfers might be related.  Then I will outline 
my empirical approach and results, and finally I will discuss the meaning of the results and 
potential next steps. 
2. What is known about subjective life expectancy and economic 
behavior 
Subjective survival probability (SSP) is a little-used covariate in the economics literature, 
and so it might be useful first to establish if it represents a meaningful measure of a person’s 
lifespan, and also to note the contexts in which it has been used to date.  This section will review 
papers which validate using subjective survival probability as a proxy for people’s actual survival 
probability.  It will also point out empirical papers which employ the subjective survival 
probability and other subjective measures from the HRS.  What will be shown is that while this 
data is valid and could be extremely useful if incorporated into empirical models of economic 
behavior, few researchers have taken advantage of it.16   
The validity of using SSP data was first established by Daniel Hamermesh (1985).  
Hamermesh, using a sample of 650 white male economists, showed that people’s subjective 
                                                          
16
 For background on the use of all types of subjective probabilities in the economics literature, and particularly on the 
renewed interest in including subjective questions in surveys, see Manski (2004). 
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survival probabilities in 1985 reflected recent changes in actuarial life tables, but the distribution 
of the subjective probabilities was flatter and had greater variance than the actuarial tables 
themselves. In a strongly stated conclusion to his paper, Hamermesh asserted that “empirical 
studies of life-cycle saving, investment in human capital and labor supply ignore changing life 
expectancy and its effects on subjective horizons and survival probabilities at the expense of 
realism.”    
Ten years later, Hurd and McGarry (1995) used SSP data from a more representative 
sample to again show the validity of this type of survey question.  The question from Wave 1 of 
the Health and Retirement Study asks respondents to evaluate, on a scale of 0 to 1017, their 
probability of living to ages 75 and 85.  Hurd and McGarry found that the responses aggregate to 
population probabilities and covary with other variables, such as income and health-related 
behaviors (like smoking) in the same way that the actual outcomes covary with these variables.  
They, like Hamermesh, assert that there is great potential in the use of subjective survival 
probability data to help economists to understand decision-making under uncertainty. 
Of course, there are also questions that are raised in the use of this data.  Lillard and 
Willis (2000) looked at a wide variety of subjective probability questions in the HRS, including 
subjective survival probability, to examine how portfolio and asset choices are affected by 
probabilistic thinking.  (The motivation for this work was the political debate about individuals 
having more choice in the determination of their pension asset investments.)  One of their key 
conclusions was that focal point answers in subjective probabilities such as 0%, 50% or 100% 
actually reflect uncertainty about the actual probability.  In the most recent wave of the Health 
                                                          
17
 In subsequent waves this scale was change to a scale of 0 to 100. 
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and Retirement Study, specific questions addressing this issue have been asked of focal point 
respondents. 
One of the other subjective questions in the HRS, which I also employ in this study, is the 
subjective probability of leaving a bequest.  Smith (1999) establishes the validity of the subjective 
bequest responses, showing that they covary in reasonable ways with other predictors of bequests. 
Hurd and Smith (2002) use subjective bequest probabilities combined with information on actual 
bequests obtained from HRS “exit” interviews to predict patterns of bequests for the generation 
just ahead of the baby-boomers. 
Empirical work employing the SSP data from the HRS is just starting to emerge.  Hurd, 
Smith and Zissimopolous (2004) found a relationship between SSP and retirement and Social 
Security uptake, with people with very low subjective survival probabilities of living to age 85 
retiring and claiming Social Security benefits earlier, as opposed to delaying their claims and 
increasing their Social Security annuitization. 18  Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun (2006) 
modeled optimal savings behavior, using HRS lifetime income data, and then regressed 
deviations from “optimal saving” on a number of variables, including SSP.  They did not find any 
relationship between deviations from the optimal behavior and a person’s subjective probability 
of living to age 75 or 85.  (This might be expected given Hurd and McGarry’s (1995) findings 
that the HRS subjective survival probabilities reasonably approximate the life cycle tables upon 
which Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun base their optimal savings estimates.)  Bloom, et al 
(2006) showed an effect of increased subjective survival probability on household wealth 
accumulation, with no effect on length of working life.  To do this they used an instrumental 
                                                          
18
 Hurd, Smith and Zissimopolous (2004) claim an “effect” of SSP on retirement and Social Security uptake, but they 
do not discuss the potential endogeneity of the SSP variable.  For example, saying one has a very low possibility of 
living to age 85 may be correlated with certain personality traits, such as pessimism, that may lower one’s employment 
opportunities or job quality, making one more likely to retire at an earlier age.  
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variables approach to avoid reverse causality issues and problems with focal points and 
measurement errors.  The respondents’ parents’ current age or age at death was the instrument 
employed. 
Like the above papers, this paper also uses the SSP data to help understand decision-
making of a different type: whether or not and how much money to transfer to adult children.  
There is a large intergenerational transfers literature, but many questions remain about the 
motivations for both inter vivos transfers and bequests and the factors affecting transfers besides 
the well-studied income and wealth effects.  The descriptive patterns I find, particularly the 
differences between mothers and fathers, could highlight directions for future research.   
 
3. Correlation vs. Causality 
Identifying a correlation between subjective survival probability and intergenerational 
transfers is very different from determining causality.  Parents’ subjective longevity is correlated 
with all types of unobservable personal traits that could very well affect their relationships, both 
financial and otherwise, with their children.  This does not mean that causality does not exist, but 
assuming causality could lead to very erroneous conclusions if the relationship is simply spurious.  
Below I will outline not only the potential causal channels, but just as importantly, the potential 
spurious channels through which a relationship between these variables might be observed. 
Perhaps the most intuitive causal channel supposes that a person who thinks they will 
have a long lifespan saves more to finance more retirement years. Very simply, a longer expected 
life could lead to more saving and less giving to children. 
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A less simple causal channel, but one with interpretations that would be meaningful to 
economists studying intergenerational transfers, comes from considering the lifecycle model of 
savings and consumption, in which the issue of a person’s own belief about his or her longevity is 
crucial.  In this model, transfers to children could potentially be lumped into either consumption 
or savings, depending upon the parent’s motivation for giving the transfer.  On the one hand, for 
an altruistic parent a transfer could be considered a “consumption” good – expenditures on the 
child raise the parent’s current utility. On the other hand, a parent who gives in the hopes that a 
child will provide physical, economic or emotional support as the parent ages (e.g. an “exchange” 
motivation) might consider a transfer to a child a method of “saving.”  In the first case, a shorter 
life expectancy would be related to a parent consuming more in the present, and thus giving more 
to the child.  In the second case, a longer life expectancy would be related to a parent saving more 
by giving more to the child.  If we were to observe a positive or negative sign on the correlation 
between SSP and transfers, we might be tempted to conclude something about the nature of the 
motivation for transfers. 
The first problem in interpreting a correlation between SSP and transfers as causal, 
however, is that causality could go in either direction.  Does having a higher SSP result in more 
financial transfers to children, or do financial transfers to children result in a parent having a 
higher SSP?  Receiving transfers from their parents might cause recipient children to give more 
care and attention to their parents, which leads to greater parental well-being.  An underlying 
exchange relationship would result in a positive correlation between transfers and SSP, with the 
causal effect due to the transfers.   
The next problem is that any correlation could simply be spurious.   For example, a 
person’s subjective longevity might be correlated with unmeasured lifetime income.  Those 
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believing in a high probability of living to age 85 might also be expecting to work for more years 
than those expecting to die younger, and this increase in expected lifetime income might have an 
effect on intergenerational transfers, not the difference in subjective longevity per se.  
Alternatively, parents with optimistic outlooks might somehow be more generous, resulting in 
those with higher SSPs coincidentally giving more to their children.  As a final example, financial 
transfers from parent to child could be the result of negative situations in the life of the child – job 
loss, death of a spouse, illness or addiction – all of which could cause stress on the parent and 
decrease parental well-being and thus SSP, resulting in a negative correlation between SSP and 
transfers.  In all these examples, the correlations would be caused by unobservables. 
There could be ways to determine if there is a causal relationship between SSP and 
intergenerational transfers, but different data from what is available would be necessary, or a 
valid instrument for SSP would be required.19  Ideally, one could imagine an experiment in which 
randomly selected parents were assigned a lifespan, and then one could observe the different 
patterns of giving among people whose unobservable attributes are randomly distributed, and for 
whom giving a transfer would have no impact on the timing of their demise.   Closer to reality, if 
there were a dataset that followed a group of individuals who might receive at some point an 
exogenous shock to their longevity expectations (a diagnosed illness unrelated to lifestyle 
characteristics, for example) and who were perfectly insured and who were post-retirement, so 
the diagnosis did not affect their lifetime earnings except through public transfers, then we would 
have a better chance of answering the question of causality.  Observing transfers before and after 
the shock to their SSP would then inform us if there is or is not a causal relationship. 
                                                          
19
 Bloom, et al (2006) use the respondents’ parents’ current age, or age at death, as an instrument in their examination 
of SSP and retirement and savings behavior.  This is a possible approach I could take in future research. 
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The data that is available does not allow for this level of control, but the correlations, if 
interpreted with caution, can still inform us of the trends in intergenerational transfers we might 
expect to observe as longevity increases.  In the next section I will explain why the Health and 
Retirement Study provides the best data available for a descriptive analysis of this question, and 
outline the empirical approach to the data. 
4. The Data  
The Health and Retirement Study is uniquely suited to illustrate the correlation between 
SSP and transfers, not only because it asks the subjective survival probability question, but 
because of its target respondent group and structure.  Below I will describe the survey and 
specific questions used,  the subsample of the survey respondents included in this study, as well 
as the cross-sectional and panel samples used in the analysis,  
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a panel dataset examining respondents who 
were between the ages of 51 and 61 at the first wave of the study in 1992, along with their 
spouses.   Their children predominantly fall in the age range of 20 to 30 years old, when they are 
likeliest to be given inter vivos transfers by their parents. (Schoeni, 1997)  The purpose of the 
study is to survey older Americans as they move into retirement in order to capture a wide variety 
of information regarding their health, finances, retirement planning, family relationships, social 
support and use of Social Security, Medicare and other public and private benefits.   In the first 
and in subsequent waves the HRS applied “direct” measurement to expectational issues, such as 
subjective longevity, age at retirement, adverse health events, the macroeconomic environment 
they would face in the future, and their ability to count on benefits such as Social Security.  (For 
more information, see Juster and Suzman, 1995.)  These expectational measures are key to the 
analysis to follow. 
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The main subsample I use from the HRS is the 1,860 unmarried (separated, divorced, 
widowed, never-married) respondents with at least one child who responded in HRS Wave 1 to 
the question: 
“Using any number from zero to ten where 0 equals absolutely no chance and 10 equals 
absolutely certain, what do you think are the chances you will live to be 75 or more? To 
85 or more?” 20  
This sample includes 1353 mothers and 507 fathers with an average age of 55.5 and with 
an average of 3.3 children.  Using these parents, I examine the correlation between aggregate 
transfers, or the sum of all transfers given by the parent to all his or her children, and SSP.  For 
simplicity’s sake and because the correlative patterns are the same, I limit my discussion to 
aggregate transfers across all children, although I also examined  the 6480 matched parent-child 
pairs, looking at transfers given by the parent to a particular child, which allowed me to control 
more completely for the characteristics of the recipient child.  (Results available upon request.) 
In analyzing the correlation of SSP with the incidence and amount of transfers given, I 
use three different subsamples of the data, taking advantage of the rich cross-sectional data 
available, and the panel nature of the dataset: 
1) A cross-section of Wave 1 respondents, using only Wave 1 reports of transfers given 
in the last 12 months. (The exact wording of the transfers question can be found in 
Appendix 1.) 
                                                          
20
 I use the age 85 probability response rather than the age 75 probability because the higher age incorporates 
information regarding the younger age and provides a better proxy for the actual subjective lifespan. 
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2) A cross-section of Wave 1 respondents, using their Wave 1 SSP responses and the 
aggregate data on transfers given across Waves 1 through 5. 
3) A panel of respondents to Waves 1 through 5.  
The first cross section is the simplest look at the correlation, both unconditional and 
conditional, between SSP and giving across respondents.  The second cross-section takes 
advantage of a longer time horizon in which transfers might be given while still allowing the 
variation in covariates, such as income and education, across respondents to drive the correlation 
results.   Transfers from parents to adult children are not usually given at regular intervals – 
parents may give one year, and not give again for many years.  Aggregating across a 9 or 10 year 
timeframe presents a better picture of who gives and who does not.  One problem with doing this, 
however, is that not all respondents in Wave 1 participated in all 5 waves.  There was some 
overall attrition, and some respondents are missing one or two interim waves, reappearing later in 
the panel.  A respondent who does not participate in one wave, and reappears in later waves may 
or may not report all the transfers made in since the last wave, and a respondent who participates 
in 3 waves and then goes missing may be less likely to report a transfer than one who participates 
in all 5 waves.     
I deal with this issue in two ways.  I include a categorical variable which identifies how 
many waves the respondent participated in.  And, for robustness’ sake, I re-run all the analyses 
using only the respondents who participated in all five waves.  I only report here the results for 
the larger sample, including attrition, because it is possible that attrition is correlated with 
unobservables that are somehow related to subjective survival probability. 21   (These unobserved 
differences are not reflected however in the Wave 1 SSP itself.  A t-test performed on the mean 
                                                          
21
 There is some information available about the reason for attrition, but only if the interviewer was able to track down 
a family member, so this information is incomplete. 
77 
 
SSP in Wave 1 for those parents who participated in all of Waves 1 through 5 vs. those parents 
who participated in fewer than five waves shows no significant difference between their SSPs.)  
The results are almost completely robust to the samples with and without attrition. 
To control for the fact that the sum of transfer amounts for Waves 1 through 5 will be 
higher for those who participated in more waves, I sum the transfers and divide by the number of 
waves the parent participated in, giving a per wave average transfer.  This alone, however, will 
still lead to a higher probability of the incidence of a transfer for those who participate in more 
waves. For that reason, in the conditional correlations, I also include an index variable for total 
waves the respondent participated in, ranging from 1 to 5.   
The third cut of the data, the panel dataset, allows me to observe the “within” respondent 
correlation of SSP and transfers, picking up on how the variation in SSP for a respondent across 
waves might be correlated with that respondent’s variation in giving across waves.  Comparing 
across people with different SSPs in a cross section may give us one correlation, but comparing 
within people at different points in time, holding observable and unobservable characteristics of a 
certain person equal (such as underlying personality), reveals how individual movements in SSP 
may be correlated with giving. 
I also look at three other HRS questions that pertain to intergenerational transfers.  Both 
fall into the category of expectational questions.  Starting in Wave 2 respondents were asked to 
rank on a range of 1 to 100 the probability of leaving a bequest of $10,000 or greater, the 
probability of leaving a bequest of $100,000 or greater, and the probability of providing financial 
help to a friend or family member over the next 10 years of $5,000 or more.  These questions do 
not provide the same level of information that the questions on actual transfers provide, but they 
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illustrate another dimension to the potential co-movement of transfers and SSP.  (The exact 
wording of these questions is included in Appendix 2.) 
With regard to these questions, I use only a cross-sectional sample for Wave 2, for the 
sake of simplicity.  While the crosscurrents behind the potential correlations between SSP and the 
probability of leaving a bequest, or SSP and the probability of giving a major transfer to a friend 
or family member could be somewhat different than the intuition suggested in Section 3, they are 
provide potentially useful information about the patterns of parental giving. 
I should also note that throughout this examination of longevity and transfers, I examine 
mothers and fathers separately.  Giving by unmarried mothers and fathers in the HRS is quite 
different. (See Appendix Table A1) Unmarried fathers are about 20% more likely than unmarried 
mothers to provide a financial transfer to at least one of their children during the 5 waves of the 
survey included here, and give about 80% more when a transfer is given. 22  I divide the sample 
by gender to help provide any insight into these differences.  
5. Results 
 This section begins with a summary of sample characteristics.  Then I examine the 
correlations, both unconditional and conditional, between SSP and actual transfers given by 
parents to children in the three subsamples.  Finally I examine the relationship between SSP and 
the probability of bequests and future giving, using unconditional and conditional correlations, 
and non-parametric estimates.  What I find is that while an unconditional correlation exists 
between mother’s SSP and actual transfers, this correlation disappears when conditioning on 
other covariates.  Mother’s SSP is positively correlated with the probability of future bequests 
                                                          
22
 This result for fathers does not hold when fathers are married or remarried.  For example, remarried fathers have 
been shown to give less and less often than remarried mothers to their biological children of a former relationship 
(Way, 2009). 
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and transfers, to a moderate extent, both unconditionally and conditioning on the usual 
socioeconomic variables.  For fathers there is no significant correlation, unconditionally or 
conditionally between SSP and actual transfers or future bequests, but father’s SSP has a non-
linear relationship to the probability of future inter vivos transfers. 
5.1 Sample Characteristics 
Figure 1 shows the Wave 1 distribution of responses to the subjective survival probability 
question by unmarried mothers and fathers in the sample described above.  (The distributions for 
Waves 2 through 5 are in Appendix 2.)  It shows, for example, that about 270 of the women and 
about 150 of the men believed they had “0” probability of living to age 85. There is some 
clustering of the responses, for both women and men, at 0, 5 and 1023, and the SSP responses are 
divided almost 50/50 along the response of 5.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Hurd and McGarry (1995) note that this clustering could be due to the coarseness of the scale offered (a very 
optimistic person might round a 95% subjective survival probability up to 100% and answer “10”), but more likely is 
due to misunderstanding or the inability to evaluate the question properly. They conclude that despite this clustering, 
and some other inconsistencies noted in their paper, the responses still act like probabilities and aggregate to reasonable 
approximations of the life tables. 
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Figure 1 
 
People who believe they will have a longer lifespan may have different characteristics, 
than people who believe they will have a shorter lifespan.  They may be healthier, or richer, or 
have fewer children, and these differences could drive any differences observed in the giving 
patterns of people with higher or lower SSPs.  Dividing the sample into “High SSP” respondents 
(those who respond that their probability of living to age 85 is 5 or higher) and “Low SSP” 
respondents (those who respond 4 or lower) is a simple way to compare the characteristics of 
respondents as they relate to SSP.24   
  
                                                          
24
 I could further divide the sample into male/female and high/low SSP, but the trends are the same for mothers and 
fathers so for simplicity’ sake, I combine the two groups. 
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Table 1 – Sample Characteristics by Low and High Subjective Survival Probability 
(SSP) 
 Full Sample 
n=1860 
Low SSP 
n=937 
High SSP 
n=923 
 
t-test 
Parent’s Characteristics     
Male .271 .303 .242 2.983*** 
Divorced .503 .494 .512 -0.790 
Separated .150 .147 .153 -0.331 
Widowed .298 .315 .282 1.562 
Never Married .044 .044 .053 -0.937 
Health (1 to 5, 
1=excellent) 
2.90 3.24 2.55 11.86*** 
Age 55.5 55.6 55.3 2.082** 
Black .334 .246 .379 -4.749*** 
Income $25,974 $24,043 $28,545 -3.318*** 
Net Worth $92,028 $77,679 $105,251 -2.434** 
Biological Children 3.33 3.35 3.26 0.986 
% male children .505 .521 .497 1.577 
Mean age children 29.4 29.4 29.1 1.301 
Ed less than H.S. .373 .401 .319 3.729*** 
High School Ed .327 .353 .312 1.888* 
Some College .173 .150 .200 -2.838*** 
College Ed .054 .042 .070 -2.707*** 
Grad School Ed .073 .053 .099 -3.696*** 
Prob live to 85 4.35 1.41 7.32 -73.898*** 
Transfer to any child .481 .450 .530 -3.435*** 
Mean transfer to all 
children 
$2424 $2012 $2782 -1.343 
     
Children’s 
Characteristics 
 
n=6480 
 
n=3140 
 
n=3010 
 
Male .498 .508 .494 1.144 
Age 29.6 29.5 29.4 0.860 
Married .476 .489 .458 2.423** 
Has a child .609 .626 .585 3.279*** 
Lives <10 miles from 
parents 
.465 .488 .439 3.801*** 
Income <10K .234 .232 .223 0.894 
Income 10K to 25K .373 .384 .363 1.520 
Income >25K .335 .328 .356 -2.033** 
Ed less than H.S. .203 .220 .181 3.687*** 
High School Ed .471 .280 .456 1.827* 
Some College .178 .169 .191 -2.259** 
College Ed .116 .105 .131 -3.179*** 
Grad School Ed .033 .027 .040 -2.761*** 
Transfer received .247 .221 .288 -6.054*** 
Amt of transfer received $1419 $1224 $1588 -1.335 
Note: Data from Wave 1 of Health and Retirement Study, 1992, except transfer data which is summed across Waves1-5 and reported 
per wave.   Low SSP is an SSP of 4 or lower.  High SSP is an SSP between 5 amd 10. 
†Amount of transfer given/received if the parent gave or child received a transfer 
* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 1 shows that High SSP respondents have higher mean income and wealth, they are 
more likely to have at least some post-secondary education and they are more likely to be black.25  
Their self-reported health status is better than Low SSP respondents.  High SSP respondents are 
also more likely to be female, and are slightly younger than their Low SSP counterparts.26  They 
give transfers at a higher rate.  Their children are less likely to be married, less likely to have 
children of their own and less likely to live within 10 miles of their parents than children of Low 
SSP respondents.  Their children are also more likely to have an income of over $25,000 per year 
and are more likely to have some post-secondary education.   
These two groups are not significantly different, however, when it comes to their marital 
status (divorced, separated, widowed or never-married), their number of children, their children’s 
ages and the mean amount they give if they provide a transfer to their children. 
Because this is a select subset of unmarried parents, it is important to keep in mind that 
this group will have different characteristics than we would find in the population of older parents 
as a whole.  58% of the mothers and 83% of the fathers are separated or divorced and not 
remarried.  36% of the mothers and 13% of the fathers are widowed.  Given the relatively young 
age of the sample, these widows and widowers were either married to people who had severe 
health problems for their age, or were married to much older spouses.  5% of the mothers and 4% 
of the fathers report they were never-married, which for people born in the 1930’s and early 
1940’s would have been an unusual situation.  These marital status categories are correlated with 
                                                          
25
 Actuarially, blacks are less likely to live to age 85 than whites, and this inconsistency between the self-reported 
survivial probability and actual probability is noted and discussed in Hurd and McGarry (1995). 
26
 While the age difference between High and Low SSP groups is not large, it is significant, and it is the opposite of 
what some economists might expect.  While one might expect that for older people the probability of living to age 85 
would be higher because one is already closer to that age than a younger person, in this sample the opposite is true.  
There is a negative correlation between age and SSP for both women (-0.051, significant at 10% level) and men  
(-0.093, significant at 5% level).  It may be that for this 51 to 61 year-old age group, the type of updating to the 
probability of living to age 85 that happens from year to year is more affected by negative health shocks than by the 
perceived success of having survived another year.  
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other characteristics that make this sample potentially very different than the population as a 
whole, and all the following results should be interpreted with that in mind. 
5..2 Subjective Survival Probability and Actual Transfers Given 
Table 2 - Unconditional Correlations – SSP Wave 1 and Transfers Wave 1-5 
 Mothers Fathers 
 Correlation P-value Correlation P-value 
SSP and transfer 
incidence in any 
wave 
0.108 
n=1353 
0.000 0.042 
n=507 
0.351 
SSP and transfer 
amount (mean per 
wave) if transfer>0 
0.075 
n=630 
0.004 0.009 
n=281 
0.878 
Note: Data from Health and Retirement Study.  SSP is from Wave 1 (1992).  Transfer data is summed across Waves1-5. 
 
Table 2 shows the unconditional correlations between the SSP in Wave 1 and transfers 
given in Waves 1 through 5.  There is a positive correlation between mothers’ SSP and the 
incidence of a transfer (0.108), and a positive correlation with the transfer amount (0.074).  There 
is no significant correlation between fathers’ SSP and giving.27   Figures 2 and 3 which show the 
breakdown in incidence of giving and in transfer amount by SSP for the same sample reflect a 
similar magnitude in the relationship between SSP and transfers for mothers only.  Mothers show 
                                                          
27
 I look at the wave by wave correlation as well, (see Appendix Table A2) and what I find is that the correlation 
coefficient for transfer incidence bounces around quite a bit, from a high of 0.108 for mothers in Wave 1, to a low and 
insignificant 0.008 in Wave 3.  For fathers the coefficients show slightly more consistency, and decrease from Wave 1 
through Wave 5, but the significance only exists at the high of 0.157 in Wave 1.  Because intergenerational transfers 
occur irregularly, a parent could report have the same SSP through all waves, and only report a transfer in one or two of 
them.  For this reason I think taking the transfer incidence in any of Waves 1 through 5 gives the best picture of the 
correlation. 
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a slight, though non-linear, upward trend for both transfer incidence and amount and fathers show 
no trend at all.28   
Figure 2 
 
Figure 3 
 
                                                          
28
 Corresponding figures for the cross section using Wave 1 data only and for the panel sample reflect a similar pattern 
for mother’s transfer incidence, and can be found in Appendix 3.  For the panel sample, there also seems to be positive 
co-movement between the father’s SSP and transfer incidence. 
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 Next, I condition the correlations upon the respondent characteristics found in Table 1.  
Most of these covariates are those normally found in transfer estimations, such as income, wealth, 
education level, age, number of children and an indicator for the respondent being black.  I also 
include indicators for the respondent’s subjective health assessment being “excellent”, “very 
good”, “fair” or “poor”, with an assessment of “good” being the omitted category.  Health is 
correlated with SSP, and could be related to giving in a variety of ways.  Parents in poor health 
may give more to their children in exchange for children’s attention or caregiving services, for 
example.   
All of the respondents are unmarried, but I include indicators for the respondent being 
separated, widowed or never-married, omitting the divorced category, because these different 
marital states could carry different implications for the relationship between parent and child.  I 
also control for the mean age of the respondent’s children, the percentage of children who are 
male, and the number of children who live within 10 miles of the respondent.  In the transfers 
literature, parents are consistently shown to give more to younger children, while the gender of 
the child may also factor into giving by the parent.29  A child who lives closer is often assumed to 
give more non-monetary help to his or her parents, which may prompt more transfers from the 
parent. (See Appendix 6 for further description of variables.) 
I do a probit analysis of transfer incidence and an OLS projection of transfer amount for 
those parents who gave a transfer, for specifications 1 (Wave 1 data only) and specification 2 
(transfers aggregated Waves 1 through 5.)  In the panel sample, I use a linear probability model - 
OLS with fixed effects- for the incidence of a transfer, and also use OLS with fixed effects for the 
conditional correlation of SSP with transfer amount. 
                                                          
29
 In the matched parent-child sample that I run using the same HRS data, daughters consistently receive more transfers 
from their unmarried parents of either gender.  These results are available upon request. 
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 For mothers, the correlation coefficient between SSP30 and transfer incidence drops 
dramatically in magnitude once other covariates have been taken into account.  (See Table 3)  In 
the first two specifications, the coefficients on SSP are insignificant.  In the panel specification, 
the coefficient for SSP is negative, rather than positive, but with a very small magnitude, ( -
.0005), and is only significant at the 10% level.  Because the panel gives us the “within” 
estimates, this tells us that as a mother’s SSP changes from wave to wave, increases in her SSP 
are correlated with very slight decreases in the incidence of giving.  (A 10 point increase in SSP 
would be correlated with a 0.5% decrease in the probability of giving a transfer.)  This is the only 
specification in which SSP has a negative coefficient, and it is only significant at the 10% level.   
                                                          
30
 I transform scale of the Wave 1 SSP, 0 to 10, to the scale of the later waves SSP, 0 to 100, so that the coefficients can 
be compared across waves. 
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Table 3 –Incidence of a Transfer to Non-Coresident Child/Children 
 
 Mothers  Fathers 
 dProbit – (1)  dProbit- (2)  dProbit – (1)  dProbit – (2) 
 dF/dx z p>z  dF/dx z p>z  dF/dx z p>z  dF/dx z p>z 
SSP (0 to 100) 0.001 1.33 0.183  0.001 1.31 0.191  0.001* 1.81 0.070  0.000 0.29 0.775 
Log income 0.040*** 3.83 0.000  0.038*** 3.63 0.000  0.030* 1.81 0.071  0.001 0.08 0.939 
Log net worth 0.020*** 4.41 0.000  0.001 0.24 0.809  0.027*** 3.15 0.002  0.013*** 2.85 0.004 
Separated -0.027 -0.67 0.503  -0.082* -1.70 0.089  0.078 1.18 0.239  -0.005 -0.08 0.937 
Widowed -0.033 -1.20 0.229  -0.079** -2.36 0.018  0.122 1.63 0.103  0.071 0.96 0.340 
Never-married -0.087 -1.48 0.140  -0.138** -1.99 0.047  0.282** 2.02 0.043  0.053 0.40 0.690 
Excellent health -0.032 -0.87 0.387  -0.031 -0.66 0.509  0.135** 1.93 0.054  -0.043 -0.58 0.562 
Very good health 0.007 0.21 0.830  0.031 0.73 0.465  0.117* 1.80 0.072  -0.015 -0.21 0.830 
Fair health -0.046 -1.28 0.202  -0.060 -1.38 0.168  0.001 0.02 0.984  -0.174** -2.34 0.019 
Poor Health -0.102** -2.33 0.020  -0.154*** -3.00 0.003  -0.038 -0.42 0.675  -0.115 -1.33 0.183 
Age -0.002 -0.56 0.578  -0.009 -1.61 0.106  0.001 0.16 0.876  0.000 0.00 0.996 
Black -0.026 -0.93 0.355  -0.076** -2.27 0.023  -0.041 -0.68 0.498  0.027 0.45 0.656 
# Biological kids 0.002 0.26 0.796  -0.004 -0.39 0.693  0.018 1.35 0.176  0.004 0.29 0.771 
High school 
education 
0.052 1.56 0.118  0.175*** 4.69 0.000  0.167** 2.57 0.010  0.119* 1.94 0.053 
Some college 0.126*** 2.99 0.003  0.253*** 5.45 0.000  0.205*** 2.72 0.007  0.180** 2.51 0.012 
College education 0.190*** 3.07 0.002  0.386*** 5.87 0.000  0.225** 1.96 0.050  0.214** 2.03 0.043 
Graduate 
education 
0.381*** 5.82 0.000  0.406*** 6.26 0.000  0.278*** 2.81 0.005  0.192** 2.11 0.035 
# Kids < 10 miles 0.006 0.57 0.570  0.030** 2.34 0.019  0.020 0.99 0.323  0.049** 2.37 0.018 
% Kids male -0.007 -0.80 0.423  -0.075 -1.63 0.103  -0.018 -1.09 0.275  -0.018 -0.25 0.801 
Kids’ mean age -0.009*** -3.20 0.001  0.005 1.48 0.139  -0.023*** -4.57 0.000  -0.014*** -2.77 0.006 
Number of Waves     0.093*** 7.95 0.000      0.101*** 6.64 0.000 
 
               
Observations 1354    1353    510    507   
Pseudo R-squared 0.1611    0.1647    0.1907    0.1592   
Chi2 257.17    307.81    128.25    110.97   
Prob >chi2 0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
      Note: Data from Health and Retirement Study 
        Subsample (1) – Conditional correlation of transfer given to any non-coresident biological child in Wave 1, with SSP and other covariates from Wave 1.   
        Subsample (2) – Conditional correlation of transfer given  to any non-coresident biological child in any of Waves 1 through 5, with SSP and other covariates from Wave 1.   
        * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 3 (Continued) –Incidence of a Transfer to Non-Coresident Child/Children  
  
 Mothers  Fathers 
 Linear Probability – (3)  Linear Probability– (3) 
 Coef t p>|t|  Coef t p>|t| 
SSP -0.0005* -1.85 0.065  0.000 0.78 0.433 
Log income 0.010** 2.48 0.013  0.009 1.27 0.205 
Log net worth 0.009** 2.53 0.011  0.008 1.18 0.236 
Excellent health 0.018 0.69 0.491  -0.005 -0.12 0.908 
Very good health 0.037* 1.90 0.058  0.006 0.17 0.866 
Fair health -0.001 -0.03 0.973  -0.022 -0.53 0.593 
Poor Health -0.034 -1.04 0.299  -0.089 -1.51 0.132 
Age -0.008 -0.81 0.418  0.027 1.27 0.203 
Kids’ mean age 0.001 0.29 0.771  -0.002 -0.55 0.580 
Wave 2 0.096*** 3.59 0.000  0.038 0.69 0.493 
Wave 3 0.018 0.38 0.704  -0.109 -1.06 0.291 
Wave 4 -0.002 -0.02 0.981  -0.148 -1.02 0.310 
Wave 5 0.021 0.24 0.807  -0.258 -1.37 0.172 
Constant 0.582 1.07 0.287  -1.232 -1.03 0.305 
    
 
   
    
 
   
Observations 6087    2120   
Number of groups 2122    901   
R-squared within 0.0218    0.0198   
                   between 0.0887    0.0237   
                   overall 0.0638    0.0210   
F(13, 3952), (13,1206) 6.77    1.88   
Prob>F 0.000    0.0289   
 
       
 
       
 
       
            
   Note: Data from Health and Retirement Study 
                                                      Subsample (3) – Panel analysis HRS Waves 1-5: OLS with fixed effects  finding conditional correlation  
    of transfer given  to any non-coresident biological child with SSP and other covariates  
    * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 4 –Transfer Amount if Transfer is Given to Non-Coresident Child/Children 
 
 Mothers  Fathers 
 OLS – (1)  OLS- (2)  OLS – (1)  OLS – (2) 
 Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t 
SSP 0.001 0.57 0.567  0.003* 1.66 0.097  -0.001 -0.64 0.521  0.001 0.46 0.645 
Log income 0.088** 2.16 0.031  0.053 1.17 0.244  0.177*** 2.98 0.003  0.173*** 3.34 0.001 
Log net worth 0.037 1.60 0.111  0.011 1.09 0.276  0.084** 2.34 0.021  0.044** 2.49 0.014 
Separated 0.180 0.99 0.325  0.293 1.49 0.136  -0.002 -0.01 0.991  0.018 0.08 0.939 
Widowed 0.132 1.14 0.254  0.242* 1.92 0.056  0.254 1.14 0.254  -0.062 -0.24 0.812 
Never-married 0.653** 2.04 0.042  -0.033 -0.10 0.918  0.280 0.72 0.472  0.156 0.32 0.748 
Excellent health 0.078 0.51 0.607  0.242 1.46 0.145  0.226 1.12 0.266  0.347 1.41 0.161 
Very good health 0.190 1.41 0.158  0.168 1.13 0.261  0.047 0.24 0.811  -0.016 -0.07 0.945 
Fair health 0.171 1.03 0.306  -0.055 -0.31 0.754  0.417 1.57 0.119  0.205 0.71 0.477 
Poor Health 0.047 0.19 0.851  0.121 0.51 0.609  0.168 0.43 0.668  -0.296 -0.87 0.386 
Age 0.015 0.82 0.412  0.011 0.55 0.584  0.000 0.01 0.990  0.034 1.08 0.283 
Black -0.167 -1.35 0.177  -0.265** -2.00 0.046  -0.015 -0.08 0.935  -0.196 -0.94 0.348 
# Biological kids 0.016 0.50 0.617  0.031 0.74 0.462  -0.011 -0.28 0.781  -0.116** -2.05 0.042 
High school 
education 
0.321** 2.09 0.037  0.502*** 3.23 0.001  0.067 0.30 0.768  0.340 1.41 0.161 
Some college 0.437** 2.52 0.012  0.747*** 4.19 0.000  0.078 0.30 0.762  0.391 1.41 0.160 
College education 0.333 1.58 0.115  0.704*** 3.07 0.002  0.246 0.71 0.476  0.139 0.35 0.729 
Graduate 
education 
0.545*** 2.78 0.006  1.333*** 5.93 0.000  0.257 0.88 0.379  0.689** 2.01 0.045 
# Kids < 10 miles -0.079* -1.77 0.078  -0.050 -1.03 0.304  0.011 0.14 0.889  0.104 1.26 0.210 
% Kids male 0.023 0.59 0.554  -0.553*** -3.22 0.001  0.014 0.26 0.795  -0.173 -0.66 0.508 
Kids’ mean age -0.005 -0.40 0.687  -0.008 -0.61 0.542  -0.031** -2.05 0.042  -0.048*** -2.67 0.008 
Number of Waves     -0.089* -1.70 0.090      -0.166*** -2.71 0.007 
Constant 4.970*** 4.89 0.000  5.396*** 4.84 0.000  5.580 3.81 0.000  4.840*** 2.83 0.005 
 
               
Observations 374    630    189    381   
R-squared 0.1232    0.1575    0.2214    0.2498   
Adj. R-squared 0.0735    0.1284    0.1287    0.1890   
F 2.48    5.41    2.39    4.11   
Prob>F 0.0005    0.0000    0.0014    0.0000   
    Note: Data from Health and Retirement Study.   
     Subsample (1) – Conditional correlation of log of total transfer amount ( if transfer was given) to any non-co resident child in Wave 1, with SSP and other covariates from Wave 1.                 
     Subsample (2) – Conditional correlation of log of total mean transfer per wave (if transfer was given)  to any non-co resident child in any of Waves 1 through 5, with SSP and other    
            covariates from Wave 1. 
* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 4 (Continued) –Transfer Amount if Transfer is Given to Non-Coresident Child/Children (cont’d) 
 
  
 Mothers  Fathers 
 OLS– (3)  OLS – (3) 
 Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t 
SSP -0.001 -0.36 0.722  -0.002 -0.92 0.357 
Log income 0.026 0.89 0.373  0.028 0.79 0.428 
Log net worth 0.033 1.30 0.194  0.140*** 3.30 0.001 
Excellent health 0.020 0.15 0.877  0.174 0.90 0.371 
Very good health -0.015 -0.14 0.886  0.086 0.56 0.576 
Fair health -0.372*** -3.02 0.003  0.565*** 2.92 0.004 
Poor Health -0.506** -2.34 0.020  0.296 0.83 0.407 
Age -0.012 -0.20 0.843  -0.082 -0.98 0.326 
Kids’ mean age -0.009 -0.72 0.473  0.007 0.31 0.753 
Wave 2 -0.378** -2.42 0.016  -0.082 -0.35 0.727 
Wave 3 0.525* 1.85 0.065  0.671 1.59 0.113 
Wave 4 0.494 1.24 0.216  0.601 1.03 0.305 
Wave 5 0.423 0.82 0.412  0.955 1.27 0.204 
Constant 7.917** 2.46 0.014  10.322** 2.21 0.028 
    
 
   
 
       
Observations 1965    873   
Number of groups 1027    479   
R-squared within 0.1303    0.1113   
                   between 0.1527    0.1100   
                   overall 0.1444    0.1198   
F(13, 925), (13,381) 10.66    3.67   
Prob>F 0.0000    0.0000   
                    Note: Data from Health and Retirement Study 
                                                                       Subsample (3) – Panel analysis HRS Waves 1-5: OLS with fixed effects  finding conditional correlation  
                    of  log of total transfer amount (if transfer was given) to any non-co resident biological child, with SSP  
                    and other covariates  
                   * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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 Mothers’ conditional correlation between SSP and the amount of a transfer if one is 
given is positive and significant in the second specification with transfers aggregated across 5 
waves, but the magnitude is very small. (see Table 4)  In this case, a 10% increase in SSP is 
correlated with a 3% increase in transfer amount given. 
 For fathers, only the first specification results in any significant conditional correlation 
between SSP and incidence of a transfer, and the magnitude is very small.  A 10% increase in 
SSP would be correlated with a 1% increase in the likelihood of a transfer.     
Inclusion of SSP squared to test if there is a non-linear relationship between SSP and 
transfers results in no significant coefficients for either incidence or amount of transfers.  See 
Appendix Table A3 for these results. 
 
5.3  Subjective Survival Probability and the Probability of Future Giving 
 I have just shown that SSP and actual transfers have almost no correlation, holding 
income, education, health and other variables constant.  What about SSP and the probability of 
future transfers?  Respondents were asked to rank the probabilities, on a scale of 0 to 100, of 
leaving a bequest of $10,000 or greater, or of leaving a bequest of $100,000 or greater.  They 
were also asked the probability of giving financial help of $5,000 or more to a friend or family 
member over the next 10 years.  Below I will briefly discuss the difference between these future 
subjective probability measures and the actual transfers given data of the previous section.  Then I 
will step through the unconditional correlations, the non-parametric estimates and the conditional 
correlations between SSP and these measures.    
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There are several things to consider when looking at the following results, and 
particularly when comparing them to the results for actual transfers.  The first is that these 
expectational measures of future giving are subjective, just like the subjective survival 
probability.  For that reason we might expect them to be more highly correlated with SSP, either 
positively or negatively, for spurious reasons.  For example, a person who is very optimistic 
might be inclined to state that they have a high probability of living to age 85, and also that they 
have a high probability of leaving a future bequest, and these variables could thus show a strong 
positive correlation.  On the other hand, someone who is very pessimistic might respond that they 
have a low probability of living to age 85, but a high probability of having to give a lot of money 
to a family member, resulting in a negative correlation.  These are just two examples of many 
potential non-causal relationships in this data.31 
Another thing to keep in mind is that the potential recipients of these transfers are 
different than the recipients of the actual transfers of the previous section.  The expectational 
questions ask very generically about the probability of leaving “an inheritance” to anyone, or of 
providing “financial help” to family or friends; they do not ask about the probability of leaving a 
bequest to a child in particular (although for many people, it would be safe to assume that the 
child is the object of their bequest) or of giving help to a child.  Therefore, these questions include 
a broader range of transfer recipients than the actual transfers, which were given specifically to 
the respondent’s child or children. 
                                                          
31
 There could also be causal relationships, which are beyond the scope of this study to determine, but are interesting to 
consider.  Someone who expects to live a long time might also expect to spend down their assets over that lifespan, 
resulting in a lower probability of leaving a very large bequest.  Or, someone who expects to live a long time might also 
expect to provide large transfers to their family members while they are still alive, as a form of payment for the services 
they will need as they become frail.   
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Table 5 – Correlation Matrix – Wave 2 SSP and Transfer Variables 
 Mothers Fathers 
 SSP Trans 
 given 
Beq 
>10K 
Beq 
>100K 
Trans 
>5K 
SSP Trans 
 given 
Beq  
>10K 
Beq 
>100K 
Trans 
>5K 
SSP 1.0000 
n=1274 
    1.0000 
n=463 
 
    
Transfer 
 given  
0.0595 
n=1274 
 
1.0000 
n=1563 
   0.0544 
n=463 
 
1.0000 
 
n=605 
   
Bequest 
 >10K 
0.1088 
n=1266 
 
0.2619 
n=1471 
1.0000 
n=1471 
  0.1263 
n=458 
 
0.2176 
n=535 
1.0000 
n=535 
  
Bequest 
>100K 
0.1197 
n=1268 
 
0.2024 
n=1555 
0.5440 
n=1465 
1.0000 
n=1555 
 0.0513 
n=461 
 
0.2142 
n=600 
0.5851 
n=534 
1.0000 
n=600 
 
Transfer 
>5K 
0.1203 
n=1265 
 
0.3273 
n=1478 
0.4245 
n=1462 
0.3826 
n=1474 
1.0000 
n=1478 
0.1173 
n=458 
 
0.3038 
n=536 
0.4889 
n=528 
0.4499 
n=534 
1.0000 
n=536 
*Variables are the following (all from HRS Wave 2):  SSP - Probability from 1 to 100 of living to age 85.  Transfer given-  Having 
given a child a monetary transfer between Waves 1 and 2.  Bequest>$10K - Probability from 1 to 100 of leaving a bequest  of 
$10,000 or greater.  Bequest>100K -  Probability from 1 to 100 of leaving a  bequest of $100,000 or greater.  Transfer>5K - 
Probability from 1 to 100 of giving financial help of $5,000 or more to a friend or family member in the next 10 years.  
**All of the above correlations are significant, except for the correlation between Father’s SSP and Transfer Given and the correlation 
between Father’s SSP and the probability of giving a bequest of over $100,000. 
 
 Finally it is important to note that these variables are highly correlated with each other, 
and with actual transfers given, so when we find very similar correlations between them and SSP, 
we should not read too much into that consistency.  Table 5 shows the correlation matrix for all of 
the variables, with the unconditional correlations between SSP in Wave 2 and the actual and 
future transfer measures highlighted.  Some of the correlations between the expectational 
variables are very high, because in a sense, all these variables represent different versions of the 
same underlying question – “What is the probability that a) you will have assets you do not 
require for your own consumption, and b) you will give them to someone else?”  
All of the correlation coefficients are around 0.11, except for the correlation between SSP 
and a father giving a bequest of over $100,000, which is lower at about 0.05.    What the 
correlations tell us is that people who expect to live longer also predict a higher probability that 
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they will give away money.  The cross-currents driving this result could be many, particularly the 
effects of income and wealth, which are highly correlated with longevity.  I will control for these 
variables below. 
 Next, I use non-parametric estimation32 to get another perspective on the potential co-
movement between SSP and expected future giving.  This drops the assumption of any functional 
form.  Figures 4a, 4b and 4c reveal that for mothers, there is a consistent, positive co-movement 
between SSP and the probability of a bequest or transfer, which peaks at an SSP of about 80, and 
then becomes negative in all three graphs.  For fathers, the shapes of the non-parametric curves 
are not nearly as consistent across the three expected transfer measures and show potential non-
linearities, particularly in the cases of a bequest of $100,000 or more, or a future transfer of 
$5,000 or more.   
Figure 4a 
  
                                                          
32
 This estimate is a simple smoothing function, regressing likelihood of a bequest or transfer (y) on SSP (x), and using 
a weighted average of the predicted y’s in the neighborhood of a given x to draw the relationship between y and x. 
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Figure 4b 
 
Figure 4c 
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Finally, I examine the conditional correlations between SSP and the three expected 
transfer variables, conditioning on the same covariates listed above.  For both parents, I run two 
specifications to determine the conditional correlation between SSP and each expected bequest or 
transfer variable.  The first assumes a linear relationship, and the second includes SSP-squared to 
test for a non-linear relationship.  For mothers and fathers the results are different, as seen in 
Tables 6 and 7.   
For mothers, the conditional correlations between SSP and expected future transfers 
(Table 6) continue to be significant, and keep a similar magnitude to the unconditional 
correlations.  (The addition of a squared term does not result in any significant results for SSP, so 
the relationship is most likely linear.)  This means that when controlling for income, wealth, 
health, education, and other covariates, a higher SSP is moderately correlated with an unmarried 
mother’s probability of leaving a bequest.  For example, a mother who believes there is a 50% 
chance of living to age 85 would be predicted to report her probability of leaving a bequest of 
over $10,000 to be about 4.5 points higher than a mother who believes there is no chance of 
living to age 85, all else equal.   These 4.5 points represent almost 10% of the mean response to 
the question for mothers, who on average report 48.8 (on a scale of 0 to 100) as their chance of 
leaving such a bequest. (See Appendix Table A5 for the means of all these responses.)  As far as 
leaving a bequest of $100,000 or greater, the 4.3 point predicted difference between a mother 
with an SSP of 50 and a mother with an SSP of 0 represents about 22% of the mean of 17.4.  For 
giving a transfer of greater than $5,000 in the next 10 years, the same predicted difference would 
be 3.9 points or about 18% of the mean of 21.4. 
Fathers show no conditional correlation between SSP and expected bequests.  They do 
however show a very significant positive non-linear relationship between SSP and the probability 
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of providing a financial transfer of $5,000 or more in the specification which includes SSP-
squared.  Holding all else equal, a father with an SSP of 50 would be predicted to have about a 15 
point higher probability of giving a future transfer than one with an SSP of 0.  This represents 
about 45% of the mean response of 33 for fathers. The coefficients on SSP and SSP-squared 
show that holding all else equal, at an SSP of 54 a father’s predicted probability of giving a 
transfer would be at its maximum. 
 Of course, the interpretation of these results should be done with caution.  Even 
controlling for current income and net worth does not take into account that a mother, for 
example, who believes she has many more years of healthy life may expect to build up more 
assets by working longer and thus believe it more likely she will leave a bequest.  If she simply 
had an exogenous shock to SSP that did not affect her anticipated years of working, we may not 
see any significant correlation at all. 
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Table 6 – Conditional Correlation of SSP with Probability of Bequests and Future Transfers – Mothers  
HRS Wave 2 
 
 Mothers –Probability of Bequest >10K  Mothers – Probability of Bequest >100K 
 OLS  OLS  OLS   OLS  
 Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t 
SSP (0 to 100) 0.089** 2.50 0.013  -0.066 -0.57 0.571  0.085*** 2.73 0.006  0.086 0.84 0.401 
SSP  squared     0.002 1.39 0.165      0.000 -0.01 0.990 
Log income 0.877 1.57 0.117  0.904 1.61 0.107  0.451 0.91 0.365  0.451 0.91 0.365 
Log net worth 4.643*** 13.37 0.000  4.673*** 13.44 0.000  2.265*** 7.44 0.000  2.265*** 7.42 0.000 
Separated 1.181 0.30 0.766  1.139 0.29 0.774  2.324 0.67 0.504  2.324 0.67 0.504 
Widowed 0.604 0.25 0.801  0.590 0.25 0.805  2.488 1.19 0.236  2.489 1.19 0.236 
Never-married 3.318 0.62 0.536  3.467 0.65 0.517  4.091 0.87 0.383  4.090 0.87 0.384 
Excellent health 9.605*** 2.78 0.006  9.608*** 2.78 0.005  11.669*** 3.85 0.000  11.669*** 3.85 0.000 
Very good health 3.271 1.11 0.269  3.511 1.19 0.236  3.447 1.33 0.184  3.445 1.32 0.186 
Fair health -3.689 -1.12 0.264  -3.893 -1.18 0.238  0.591 0.20 0.838  0.592 0.20 0.838 
Poor Health -11.934*** -2.98 0.003  -12.281*** -3.06 0.002  -2.708 -0.78 0.439  -2.706 -0.77 0.440 
Age -0.171 -0.55 0.584  -0.168 -0.54 0.592  -0.091 -0.33 0.740  -0.091 -0.33 0.740 
Black -1.329 -0.52 0.602  -1.580 -0.62 0.536  -1.048 -0.47 0.639  -1.046 -0.47 0.640 
# Biological kids -0.279 -0.38 0.708  -0.291 -0.39 0.695  -0.041 -0.06 0.950  -0.041 -0.06 0.950 
High school 
education 
10.386*** 3.62 0.000  10.424*** 3.63 0.000  4.224* 1.68 0.093  4.223* 1.68 0.093 
Some college 17.344*** 4.92 0.000  17.483*** 4.96 0.000  12.692*** 4.11 0.000  12.690*** 4.10 0.000 
College education 21.599*** 4.33 0.000  22.110*** 4.42 0.000  22.233*** 5.06 0.000  22.229*** 5.04 0.000 
Graduate 
education 
19.462*** 3.92 0.000  19.566*** 3.94 0.000  23.649*** 5.44 0.000  23.648*** 5.43 0.000 
# Kids < 10 miles -0.774 -0.84 0.399  -0.768 -0.84 0.403  -0.157 -0.20 0.845  -0.157 -0.20 0.845 
% Kids male -0.307 -0.38 0.702  -0.258 -0.32 0.748  -0.402 -0.57 0.568  -0.402 -0.57 0.569 
Kids’ mean age -0.357 -1.46 0.146  -0.368 -1.50 0.134  -0.294 -1.37 0.171  -0.294 -1.37 0.171 
Constant 10.884 0.66 0.511  12.642 0.76 0.446  -4.145 -0.29 0.775  -4.158 -0.29 0.775 
 
               
Observations 1054    1054    1053    1053   
R-squared 0.3753    0.3765    0.2391    0.2391   
Adj. R-squared 0.3632    0.3638    0.2244    0.2236   
F 31.03    29.67    16.22    15.43   
Prob>F 0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
Note: Data from HRS Wave 2.     * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 6 (Continued)– Conditional Correlation of SSP with Probability of Bequests and Future Transfers  – Mothers  
HRS Wave 2 
 
 Mothers –Probability of Providing >$5K in Financial Help 
 OLS  OLS 
 Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t 
SSP (0 to 100) 0.077** 2.54 0.011  0.017 0.17 0.869 
SSP squared     0.001 0.64 0.524 
Log income 0.497 1.04 0.298  0.508 1.06 0.289 
Log net worth 1.695*** 5.71 0.000  1.707*** 5.74 0.000 
Separated 10.368*** 3.06 0.002  10.341*** 3.05 0.002 
Widowed 1.744 0.85 0.394  1.735 0.85 0.397 
Never-married 2.196 0.48 0.631  2.245 0.49 0.624 
Excellent health 5.450* 1.85 0.065  5.449* 1.85 0.065 
Very good health 6.888*** 2.72 0.007  6.985*** 2.76 0.006 
Fair health 1.923 0.68 0.495  1.843 0.65 0.514 
Poor Health -5.187 -1.51 0.130  -5.307 -1.55 0.122 
Age -0.860*** -3.21 0.001  -0.858*** -3.21 0.001 
Black -1.026 -0.47 0.638  -1.121 -0.51 0.608 
# Biological kids -0.594 -0.93 0.351  -0.599 -0.94 0.347 
High school 
education 
3.356 1.37 0.171  3.366 1.37 0.170 
Some college 11.392*** 3.78 0.000  11.446*** 3.79 0.000 
College education 11.041** 2.59 0.010  11.236*** 2.63 0.009 
Graduate 
education 
21.793*** 5.14 0.000  21.826*** 5.14 0.000 
# Kids < 10 miles -0.592 -0.75 0.452  -0.590 -0.75 0.454 
% Kids male -0.425 -0.62 0.536  -0.404 -0.59 0.557 
Kids’ mean age -0.296 -1.42 0.157  -0.300 -1.44 0.151 
Constant 51.704*** 3.66 0.000  52.395*** 3.70 0.000 
 
       
Observations 1050    1050   
R-squared 0.2067    0.2039   
Adj. R-squared 0.1881    0.1877   
F 13.15    12.54   
Prob>F 0.0000    0.0000   
              Note: Data from HRS Wave 2.   * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 7 – Conditional Correlation of SSP with Probability of Bequests and Future Transfers – Fathers  
HRS Wave 2 
 
 Fathers –Probability of Bequest >10K  Fathers – Probability of Bequest >100K 
 OLS  OLS  OLS   OLS  
 Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t 
SSP (0 to 100) 0.083 1.33 0.184  -0.203 -0.97 0.331  0.005 0.08 0.940  -0.018 -0.09 0.930 
SSP  squared     0.003 1.44 0.151      0.000 0.12 0.908 
Log income 1.639* 1.68 0.093  1.585 1.63 0.104  1.862* 1.95 0.052  1.857* 1.94 0.053 
Log net worth 5.955*** 8.37 0.000  6.123*** 8.50 0.000  4.722*** 6.54 0.000  4.736*** 6.47 0.000 
Separated -8.075 -1.46 0.146  -8.574 -1.55 0.123  -10.325* -1.87 0.063  -10.359* -1.87 0.063 
Widowed 1.536 0.29 0.771  1.446 0.27 0.784  1.001 0.19 0.852  0.993 0.19 0.853 
Never-married -19.008* -1.67 0.097  -18.632 -1.63 0.103  -3.267 -0.28 0.778  -3.240 -0.28 0.780 
Excellent health 2.213 0.42 0.676  2.077 0.39 0.695  12.611** 2.35 0.020  12.599** 2.34 0.020 
Very good health 0.095 0.02 0.984  0.231 0.05 0.962  10.870** 2.20 0.028  10.881** 2.20 0.028 
Fair health -9.810 -1.61 0.109  -10.316* -1.69 0.092  0.761 0.12 0.902  0.724 0.12 0.907 
Poor Health -1.475 -0.18 0.855  -3.723 -0.45 0.650  -6.088 -0.76 0.449  -6.258 -0.77 0.445 
Age -0.955* -1.70 0.090  -0.964* -1.72 0.086  -0.289 -0.51 0.611  -0.289 -0.51 0.611 
Black 7.785 1.57 0.118  8.422* 1.69 0.092  4.417 0.88 0.377  4.466 0.89 0.374 
# Biological kids -2.412** -1.99 0.047  -2.246* -1.85 0.065  -1.286 -1.05 0.295  -1.273 -1.03 0.302 
High school 
education 
7.381 1.51 0.133  7.508 1.53 0.126  -1.947 -0.39 0.695  -1.938 -0.39 0.697 
Some college 10.785* 1.94 0.054  11.039** 1.99 0.048  5.399 0.96 0.339  5.417 0.96 0.338 
College education 15.371 1.54 0.125  16.693* 1.66 0.097  6.828 0.67 0.502  6.932 0.68 0.498 
Graduate 
education 
11.383 1.62 0.107  11.774* 1.68 0.095  8.433 1.18 0.237  8.459 1.19 0.237 
# Kids < 10 miles 0.515 0.29 0.775  0.728 0.40 0.687  1.968 1.08 0.283  1.985 1.08 0.281 
% Kids male 0.891 0.61 0.541  0.678 0.46 0.643  -0.041 -0.03 0.978  -0.057 -0.04 0.969 
Kids’ mean age 0.247 0.65 0.515  0.256 0.68 0.498  -0.573 -1.51 0.131  -0.573 -1.51 0.132 
Constant 34.681 1.12 0.263  37.482 1.21 0.227  -4.840 -0.16 0.877  -4.618 -0.15 0.883 
 
               
Observations 352    352    354    354   
R-squared 0.3791    0.3830    0.3078    0.3078   
Adj. R-squared 0.3416    0.3437    0.2662    0.3640   
F 10.10    9.75    7.40    7.03   
Prob>F 0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
 Note: Data from HRS, Wave 2.           * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 7 (Continued) Conditional Correlation of SSP with Probability of Bequests and Future Transfers  – Fathers  
HRS Wave 2 
 
 Fathers –Probability of Providing >$5K in Financial Help 
 OLS  OLS 
 Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t 
SSP (0 to 100) 0.063 1.01 0.312  0.544*** 2.67 0.008 
SSP squared     -0.005** -2.48 0.014 
Log income 2.493*** 2.67 0.008  2.605*** 2.80 0.005 
Log net worth 2.075*** 2.94 0.003  1.775** 2.50 0.013 
Separated -5.794 -1.06 0.290  -5.019 -0.92 0.357 
Widowed -0.926 -0.18 0.860  -0.845 -0.16 0.871 
Never-married -17.662 -1.56 0.120  -18.254 -1.63 0.105 
Excellent health 5.700 1.08 0.280  5.914 1.13 0.258 
Very good health 6.809 1.40 0.162  6.631 1.38 0.170 
Fair health -4.605 -0.76 0.447  -3.920 -0.65 0.515 
Poor Health -11.062 -1.41 0.161  -7.632 -0.96 0.336 
Age 0.428 0.77 0.442  0.442 0.80 0.425 
Black 10.521** 2.14 0.033  9.438* 1.93 0.054 
# Biological kids -1.224 -1.02 0.310  -1.464 -1.22 0.222 
High school 
education 
9.050* 1.86 0.064  8.825* 1.82 0.069 
Some college 11.981** 2.17 0.031  11.692** 2.13 0.034 
College education 17.464* 1.75 0.080  15.209 1.53 0.126 
Graduate 
education 
21.176*** 3.03 0.003  20.556*** 2.96 0.003 
# Kids < 10 miles 1.292 0.72 0.473  0.941 0.53 0.600 
% Kids male -0.493 -0.34 0.733  -0.173 -0.12 0.904 
Kids’ mean age -1.120*** -3.00 0.003  -1.121*** -3.03 0.003 
Constant -11.884 -0.39 0.698  -16.919 -0.56 0.578 
 
       
Observations 353    353   
R-squared 0.2446    0.2583   
Adj. R-squared 0.1991    0.2113   
F 5.37    5.49   
Prob>F 0.0000    0.0000   
              Note: Data from HRS Wave 2.     * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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6.  Discussion 
 In considering all the above results, it is important to keep in mind the very select sample 
being analyzed – separated, divorced, widowed or never-married parents between the ages of 51 
and 61.  The correlation between these parents’ expectations of their own longevity and actual 
transfers given to their children is slight to nil for both mothers and fathers.  While for mothers 
there is an observed unconditional correlation, this correlation disappears upon controlling for 
income, wealth, education level and other covariates.   
In terms of expected future giving, however, a correlation between SSP and transfers 
persists for mothers in all cases, unconditional and conditional.  For fathers, there is a non-linear 
relationship, peaking at an SSP of 54, in the case of giving a future transfer to family or friends, 
and there is no conditional correlation for anticipated bequests.  Why might SSP be positively 
correlated with expected future bequests and transfers for unmarried mothers?  And why might 
the case be different for unmarried fathers? 
 Imagine first that the relationship between SSP and mothers’ expected bequests and 
transfers is spurious.  These correlations are simply the result of a causal relationship between 
some unobserved characteristic that is correlated with SSP, which impacts anticipated giving.  A 
higher SSP could be correlated with higher lifetime expected earnings, for example, and maybe 
mothers take this into account in thinking about their ability to make a bequest or provide a 
transfer in the future.  Another channel for this correlation could be a sense of optimism.  Having 
an optimistic personality could lead someone to think they have a high probability of living to age 
85, and a high probability of being able to give to their children. 
Say, on the other hand, that the relationship between SSP and anticipated transfers and 
bequests is causal.  Below I use very simple model to illustrate one potential causal channel, for 
103 
 
mothers and fathers, and then suggest how further development of the model might help us 
understand the gender differences observed in the results above. 
  Take a basic two-period model of consumption and savings.  In period 1, a single parent 
works and earns an income, I , consumes 1c
 
and saves w .  In period 2, the parent is retired and 
earns an annuity income A , consumes 2c
 
and purchases utility-providing services 2x from their 
children.33 (These services, such as companionship or help around the house for example, could 
be paid for inter-vivos or through a promised bequest.)  The parent determines how much to save 
in period 1 based on their utility function and their expectation, s , of living to period 2, where 
0 1s≤ ≤ .  Using a simple log utility function, expected utility across both periods would be: 
 1 2 2 1 2 2[ ( , , )] ln (ln ln )E U c c x c s c xα= + +  
 
where α is the preference parameter for services.34  The first period and second period constraints 
are 
 
1
2 2
c I w
c A w x
= −
= + −
 
 
Simply substituting the constraints into the utility function and taking the first order 
conditions to maximize expected utility gives the equations for optimal savings, *w , and optimal 
services, *x , (in other words, the optimal transfers to children). 
                                                          
33
 In this very simple framework, I could also explain the transfer/bequest 2x  as motivated by altruism.  
34
 For the sake of simplicity I have omitted a discount parameter on period 2 utility and an interest rate, but both could 
be included without changing the outcome I am illustrating here.   
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2*
1
sI A x
w
s
− +
=
+
 
 2 * ( )1x A w
α
α
= +
+
 
 
Differentiating with respect to s shows the optimal choice of both w and x2  increasing 
with respect to increases in s . (See Appendix 7).  Very simply, the higher a person’s subjective 
probability they will live until period 2, the more they save and as a result, the more they spend 
on services from their children (transfers). 
This very simple model illustrates how someone’s subjective survival probability could 
be positively related to anticipated transfers or bequests.  Future work could build a more robust 
model of this relationship, including parameters or variables that could be different for men and 
women, which might help explain the observed differences in giving between mothers and 
fathers.  For example, the preference parameter for services, α, could change if the parent is in the 
married state.  The remarriage probabilities for men and women are different and thus the 
expected preference for these services in period 2 would be different.  Including these types of 
parameters and then testing empirically with a properly identified model could help to explain the 
different results I find for mothers and fathers in the correlation between SSP and anticipated  
transfers, and perhaps add to our understanding of the motivations for transfers.35 
One way to properly identify an empirical model and thus determine causality would be 
to find a suitable instrumental variable for subjective survival probability, and this is another 
objective for future research.  Perhaps using the respondent’s parents’ ages as was done in 
                                                          
35
 The exchange motivation (Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985, Cox, 1987, Cox and Rank, 1992) and the altruism 
motivation for transfers (Becker, 1974 and 1981, Altonji, Hayashi & Kotlikoff, 1996 and 1997) both have strong 
theoretical and empirical underpinnings.  The HRS data in particular provides a lot of data for further examining the 
exchange motivation, due to extensive questions on help needed and received by respondents. 
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Bloom, et al (2006), would be an option, but there are surely others.  Another potential future step 
would be to look at more recent waves of the HRS to see if the predictions parents made about 
their transfers and bequests were borne out, and if, for example, those mothers who had a higher 
SSP actually did end up giving more transfers later in their life.   
Taking a broader look at future directions, it is important to consider these descriptive 
mother/father differences in the context of other mother/father differences, noted here and in 
other papers.  Even controlling for income and wealth, unmarried fathers give more and more 
often, and say they are more likely to give future bequests and transfers than unmarried mothers 
are.  If one considers Table 4, which shows the conditional correlations for the amount of a 
transfer if one is given, the income and wealth coefficients for fathers are higher than for mothers, 
but education levels are strongly positively correlated with transfer amount and with future 
intended bequests (Table 6) for mothers, but not for fathers. Previous research has shown that the 
remarriage of fathers is correlated with significant drops in transfer incidence and transfer amount 
to children of a former marriage, while the remarriage of mothers is not correlated with transfers. 
(Way, 2009) There are many gender differences in parental giving that are just starting to be 
explored in the literature, and many potential avenues for future research. (See Cox, 2003 for a 
review of the research and other insights on gender differences in intergenerational transfers.)  
6. Conclusion 
This paper utilizes a unique and little-used question from the Health and Retirement 
Study, which provides a direct measure of a person’s expectations of living to age 85, to 
determine if subjective longevity is correlated with intergenerational transfers from unmarried, 
older parents to their children.  A positive conditional correlation was found for mothers’ 
anticipated future bequests and transfers, and a non-linear relationship was found for fathers’ 
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anticipated future transfers only.  All of the magnitudes of the correlations found were moderate 
or slight.  While the implications of these results for intergenerational transfer behavior are not 
striking in and of themselves, the gender differences in parental transfers have potentially 
interesting implications.  The purely descriptive results of this paper point to interesting avenues 
of future research into the intergenerational economic relationships among the coming 
generations of older families that have undergone and continue to undergo significant 
demographic changes. 
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Appendix 1 
The transfers questions. 
The transfers question in Wave 1 is: 
“(Not counting any shared housing or shared food,) have you given (your child/any of 
your children) financial assistance totaling $500 or more in the past 12 months?”  And, 
“About how much money did that assistance amount to altogether in the past 12 
months?” 
After Wave 2 the timeframe for the question was either since the last survey, or in the last two 
years, if the participant did not participate in the previous wave.   The censoring of the data at 
$500 should be kept in mind in interpreting the results.  No observations were included for those 
children who were co-residing with their parents, although if the child was co-residing in some 
waves, and living independently in other waves, the data was included from those waves in which 
the child was living independently. 
The expectational transfer questions in Wave 2 are: 
“What are the chances that you will leave an inheritance totaling $10,000 or more?”  
“What are the chances that you will leave an inheritance totaling $100,000 or more?”  
“What are the chances that you will give financial help totaling $5,000 to grown 
children, relatives or friends over the next ten years.”  
All of the above questions are answered on a scale of 0 to 100. The bequests could include the 
value of property and assets.  The future financial help questions could  include college tuition 
help but not include shared housing or food. 
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Appendix Table A1  
 
A1.  Incidence and Amount of Transfers by Unmarried Mothers and Fathers 
Participating in at least Wave 1 of the HRS 
 
 Transfer 
Incidence 
Mean Transfer 
Amount 
All 0.481 
n=1946 
$2424 
n=936 
  Mothers 0.457 
n=1418 
$1948 
n=648 
  Fathers 0.545 
n=528 
$3493 
n=288 
t-test -3.482*** -2.560** 
 
Note: Data from Health and Retirement Study.  Transfer incidence is a 0/1 variable 
 with 1 indicating that a parent gave to at least one of their children in waves 1 through 5.   
Transfer amount data is sum of transfers given to any children across Waves 1-5  
and divided by number of waves the parent participated in, giving a per wave average  
transfer.  
* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
  
 Frequency Distributions of SSP Responses in HRS Waves 2 through 5
                                                          
36
 The SSP response scale in these waves was 0 to 100.  SSP 0 represents those responding exactly 0 to the question,  
SSP 10 represents those responding between 1 and 10, inclusive,  SSP 20 represents those respond
20, inclusive, etc. 
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Appendix 2 
Figure A2a 
Figure A2b 
36
 
 
 
ing between 11 and 
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Appendix 2 (Continued) 
Figure A2c 
Figure A2d 
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Appendix Table A2 
A2. Unconditional Correlations of Parental Transfers to Non-Co resident Children,  
Waves 1-5  
 Mothers Fathers 
SSP and transfer 
incidence 
Correlation P-value Correlation P-value 
Wave 1 .108 
n=1429 
.000 .157 
n=575 
.000 
Wave 2 .060 
n=1274 
.034 .054 
n=463 
.242 
Wave 3 .008 
n=1271 
.782 .054 
n=456 
.247 
Wave 4 .033 
n=1183 
.261 .049 
n=442 
.302 
Wave 5 .053 
n=1503 
.039 .033 
n=557 
.435 
 
    
SSP and transfer 
amount 
    
Wave 1 .068 
n=374 
.190 -.006 
n=189 
.935 
Wave 2 -.008 
n=459 
.860 -.009 
n=190 
.904 
Wave 3 -.013 
n=421 
.795 .121 
n=178 
.107 
Wave 4 -.039 
n=375 
.447 -.028 
n=176 
.713 
Wave 5 .030 
n=476 
.519 -.060 
n=200 
.400 
Note: Data from Health and Retirement Study.  Transfer incidence is a 0/1 variable, with 1 indicating that the parent gave 
to at least one child in that wave. Transfer amount is summed across  all the respondent’s children in that wave, and only 
includes non-zero amounts.   
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Appendix 3 
Figure A3a 
 
Figure A3b 
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Figure A3c 
 
 
Figure A3d 
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Appendix Table A3 –Incidence of a Transfer to Non-Coresident Child/Children 
(Includes SSP-squared) 
 
 Mothers  Fathers 
 dProbit – (1)  dProbit- (2)  dProbit – (1)  dProbit – (2) 
 dF/dx z p>z  dF/dx z p>z  dF/dx Z p>z  dF/dx Z p>z 
SSP 0.001 0.49 0.626  0.000 -0.11 0.909  0.002 0.97 0.333  0.000 -0.06 0.949 
SSP-squared 0.000 -0.09 0.925  0.000 0.53 0.594  0.000 -0.42 0.678  0.000 0.17 0.868 
Log income 0.040*** 3.83 0.000  0.039*** 3.64 0.000  0.030* 1.80 0.072  0.001 0.08 0.938 
Log net worth 0.020*** 4.39 0.000  0.001 0.25 0.803  0.027*** 3.15 0.002  0.013*** 2.85 0.004 
Separated -0.027 -0.67 0.502  -0.081* -1.69 0.092  0.078 1.18 0.239  -0.005 -0.08 0.937 
Widowed -0.033 -1.21 0.228  -0.078** -2.34 0.019  0.119 1.60 0.110  0.072 0.96 0.335 
Never-married -0.087 -1.47 0.141  -0.139** -2.00 0.045  0.289** 2.06 0.040  0.051 0.38 0.703 
Excellent health -0.032 -0.87 0.386  -0.030 -0.65 0.516  0.138** 1.96 0.050  -0.045 -0.59 0.552 
Very good health 0.007 0.21 0.833  0.032 0.75 0.454  0.116* 1.79 0.074  -0.015 -0.21 0.832 
Fair health -0.046 -1.26 0.206  -0.062 -1.42 0.156  0.001 0.02 0.987  -0.174** -2.34 0.019 
Poor Health -0.102** -2.30 0.021  -0.158*** -3.04 0.002  -0.034 -0.38 0.707  -0.117 -1.34 0.180 
Age -0.002 -0.56 0.575  -0.009 -1.59 0.113  0.001 0.17 0.864  0.000 0.01 0.996 
Black -0.026 -0.92 0.357  -0.077** -2.30 0.022  -0.039 -0.65 0.513  0.027 0.44 0.658 
# Biological kids 0.002 0.26 0.794  -0.004 -0.41 0.682  0.018 1.36 0.173  0.004 0.27 0.789 
High school 
education 
0.052 1.56 0.118  0.175*** 4.70 0.000  0.168*** 2.58 0.010  0.119* 1.93 0.053 
Some college 0.126*** 2.99 0.003  0.253*** 5.46 0.000  0.205*** 2.72 0.006  0.180** 2.51 0.012 
College education 0.190*** 3.08 0.002  0.385*** 5.86 0.000  0.224** 1.96 0.050  0.214** 2.03 0.042 
Graduate 
education 
0.381*** 5.82 0.000  0.406*** 6.25 0.000  0.277*** 2.80 0.005  0.193** 2.12 0.034 
# Kids < 10 miles 0.006 0.57 0.571  0.030** 2.35 0.019  0.020 0.98 0.326  0.049** 2.37 0.018 
% Kids male -0.007 -0.80 0.421  -0.074 -1.60 0.110  -0.017 -1.05 0.296  -0.018 -0.26 0.795 
Kids’ mean age -0.009*** -3.19 0.001  0.005 1.47 0.142  -0.023*** -4.57 0.000  -0.014*** -2.77 0.006 
Number of Waves     0.093*** 7.96 0.000      0.101*** 6.64 0.000 
    
            
Observations 1354    1353    510    507   
Pseudo R-squared 0.1611    0.1648    0.1910    0.1593   
Chi2 257.18    308.09    128.43    111.00   
Prob >chi2 0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000   
  Note: Data from Health and Retirement Study 
  Subsample (1) – Conditional correlation of transfer given to any non-coresident biological child in Wave 1, with SSP and other covariates from Wave 1.   
   Subsample (2) – Conditional correlation of transfer given  to any non-coresident biological child in any of Waves 1 through 5, with SSP and other covariates from Wave 1.   
  * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Appendix Table A3 (Continued) –Incidence of a Transfer to Non-Coresident Child/Children (cont’d) 
(Includes SSP-Squared) 
  
 Mothers  Fathers 
 Linear Probability – (3)  Linear Probability– (3) 
 Coef t p>|t|  Coef t p>|t| 
SSP  -0.001 -1.41 0.159  -0.001 -0.67 0.501 
SSP-squared 0.000 0.84 0.400  0.000 1.03 0.304 
Log income 0.010** 2.49 0.013  0.009 1.30 0.193 
Log net worth 0.009** 2.52 0.012  0.008 1.21 0.227 
Excellent health 0.018 0.68 0.495  -0.006 -0.14 0.890 
Very good health 0.037* 1.90 0.058  0.006 0.17 0.868 
Fair health -0.001 -0.06 0.950  -0.019 -0.47 0.637 
Poor Health -0.035 -1.07 0.285  -0.088 -1.48 0.140 
Age -0.008 -0.81 0.417  0.028 1.28 0.202 
Kids’ mean age 0.001 0.29 0.771  -0.002 -0.57 0.567 
Wave 2 0.097*** 3.61 0.000  0.040 0.73 0.466 
Wave 3 0.018 0.38 0.706  -0.109 -1.06 0.291 
Wave 4 -0.002 -0.02 0.982  -0.147 -1.01 0.313 
Wave 5 0.022 0.25 0.803  -0.255 -1.36 0.176 
Constant 0.592 1.08 0.279  -1.222 -1.02 0.309 
 
       
Observations 6087    2120   
Number of groups 2122    901   
R-squared within 0.0220    0.0207   
                   between 0.0855    0.0204   
                   overall 0.0621    0.0193   
F 6.34    1.82   
Prob>F 0.0000    0.0317   
    Note: Data from HRS 
                                                       Subsample (3) – Panel analysis HRS Waves 1-5: OLS with fixed effects  finding conditional correlation  
     of transfer given to any non-coresident biological child with SSP and other covariates  
     * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Appendix Table A4 –Transfer Amount if Transfer is Given to Non-Coresident Child/Children 
(Includes SSP-Squared) 
 Mothers  Fathers 
 OLS – (1)  OLS- (2)  OLS – (1)  OLS – (2) 
 Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t 
SSP -0.002 -0.36 0.720  0.011* 1.90 0.058  -0.003 -0.38 0.701  0.009 0.98 0.328 
SSP-squared 0.000 0.54 0.587  0.000 -1.48 0.140  0.000 0.20 0.844  0.000 -0.88 0.380 
Log income 0.088** 2.16 0.032  0.049 1.08 0.282  0.177*** 2.97 0.003  0.175*** 3.38 0.001 
Log net worth 0.038* 1.66 0.099  0.011 1.07 0.284  0.085** 2.33 0.021  0.042** 2.33 0.021 
Separated 0.181 0.99 0.322  0.291 1.48 0.139  -0.004 -0.02 0.983  0.037 0.16 0.875 
Widowed 0.126 1.09 0.277  0.242* 1.92 0.056  0.263 1.16 0.249  -0.080 -0.31 0.759 
Never-married 0.648** 2.02 0.044  -0.016 -0.05 0.959  0.275 0.70 0.482  0.212 0.43 0.665 
Excellent health 0.084 0.55 0.582  0.241 1.46 0.145  0.224 1.10 0.273  0.370 1.49 0.137 
Very good health 0.196 1.45 0.147  0.156 1.04 0.297  0.049 0.25 0.804  -0.027 -0.12 0.907 
Fair health 0.162 0.97 0.334  -0.036 -0.20 0.838  0.418 1.57 0.119  0.207 0.72 0.472 
Poor Health 0.029 0.11 0.910  0.156 0.66 0.511  0.164 0.42 0.677  -0.250 -0.73 0.468 
Age 0.015 0.82 0.410  0.011 0.53 0.597  0.000 0.00 0.998  0.035 1.11 0.266 
Black -0.162 -1.31 0.191  -0.258* -1.96 0.051  -0.018 -0.09 0.925  -0.195 -0.93 0.352 
# Biological kids 0.016 0.50 0.618  0.030 0.70 0.486  -0.011 -0.27 0.787  -0.108* -1.89 0.060 
High school 
education 
0.324** 2.11 0.036  0.494*** 3.19 0.002  0.062 0.27 0.785  0.349 1.44 0.151 
Some college 0.440** 2.54 0.012  0.738*** 4.14 0.000  0.074 0.29 0.775  0.409 1.47 0.144 
College education 0.332 1.57 0.116  0.716*** 3.12 0.002  0.248 0.72 0.475  0.148 0.37 0.713 
Graduate 
education 
0.545*** 2.78 0.006  1.336*** 5.95 0.000  0.255 0.87 0.383  0.696** 2.03 0.043 
# Kids < 10 miles -0.079* -1.77 0.077  -0.048 -0.99 0.320  0.011 0.15 0.884  0.102 1.23 0.220 
% Kids male 0.023 0.60 0.551  -0.565*** -3.29 0.001  0.013 0.23 0.819  -0.148 -0.56 0.573 
Kids’ mean age -0.005 -0.41 0.682  -0.008 -0.58 0.559  -0.031** -2.04 0.043  -0.049*** -2.72 0.007 
Number of Waves     -0.094* -1.78 0.076      -0.159*** -2.59 0.010 
Constant 4.997*** 4.90 0.000  5.362*** 4.81 0.000  5.613*** 3.80 0.000  4.650*** 2.70 0.007 
 
               
Observations 374    630    189    281   
R-squared 0.1239    0.1605    0.2215    0.2521   
Adj. R-squared 0.0716    0.1301    0.1236    0.1883   
F 2.37    5.28    2.26    3.95   
Prob>F 0.0007    0.0000    0.0023    0.0000   
 Note: Data from Health and Retirement Study.      Subsample (1) – Conditional correlation of log of total transfer amount ( if transfer was given) to any non-coresident child in Wave 1, with 
SSP and other covariates from Wave 1.          Subsample (2) – Conditional correlation of log of total mean transfer per wave (if transfer was given)  to any non-coresident child in any of 
Waves 1 through 5, with SSP and other   covariates from Wave 1.    * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Appendix Table A4 (Continued) –Transfer Amount if Transfer is Given to Non-Coresident Child/Children 
(Includes SSP-squared) 
  
 OLS– (3)  OLS – (3) 
 Coef. t p>t  Coef. t p>t 
SSP  0.002 0.37 0.711  -0.005 -0.77 0.441 
SSP-squared 0.000 -0.51 0.609  0.000 0.48 0.632 
Log income 0.025 0.87 0.387  0.030 0.83 0.406 
Log net worth 0.033 1.31 0.191  0.141*** 3.32 0.001 
Excellent health 0.021 0.16 0.875  0.181 0.93 0.353 
Very good health -0.015 -0.14 0.885  0.090 0.58 0.560 
Fair health -0.369*** -2.99 0.003  0.573*** 2.95 0.003 
Poor Health -0.501** -2.31 0.021  0.308 0.86 0.391 
Age -0.013 -0.22 0.826  -0.082 -0.98 0.329 
Kids’ mean age -0.010 -0.75 0.456  0.007 0.31 0.754 
Wave 2 -0.378** -2.42 0.016  -0.075 -0.32 0.750 
Wave 3 0.533* 1.87 0.061  0.669 1.58 0.114 
Wave 4 0.504 1.26 0.207  0.602 1.03 0.304 
Wave 5 0.435 0.84 0.399  0.958 1.28 0.203 
Constant 7.968** 2.47 0.014  10.311** 2.20 0.028 
    
 
   
Observations 1965    873   
Number of groups 1027    479   
R-squared within 0.1305    0.1118   
                   between 0.1500    0.1109   
                   overall 0.1429    0.1212   
F 9.91    3.42   
Prob>F 0.0000    0.0000   
         Note: Data from Health and Retirement Study 
                                                        Subsample (3) – Panel analysis HRS Waves 1-5: OLS with fixed effects  finding conditional correlation  
     of  log of total transfer amount (if transfer was given) to any non-coresident biological child, with SSP  
      and other covariates  
       * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Appendix Table A5  
Mean Responses to SSP and Parental Transfer Questions – Wave 2 
 Mothers  Fathers 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
SSP 47.3 
n=1274 
32.0 42.8 
n=463 
30.7 
Transfer given .338 
n=1563 
.473 .368 
n=605 
.479 
Probability of 
bequest >10K 
48.8 
n=1471 
44.2 58.7 
n=535 
43.4 
Probability of 
bequest>100K 
17.4 
n=1555 
33.0 24.1 
n=600 
42.0 
Probability of 
transfer>5K 
21.4 
n=1478 
32.3 33.0 
n=557 
38.1 
 
*Variables are the following (all from HRS Wave 2):  SSP - Probability from 1 to 100 of living to age 85.  Transfer 
given-  Having given a child a monetary transfer between Waves 1 and 2.  Bequest>$10K - Probability from 1 to 100 of 
leaving a bequest  of $10,000 or greater.  Bequest>100K -  Probability from 1 to 100 of leaving a  bequest of $100,000 or 
greater.  Transfer>5K - Probability from 1 to 100 of giving financial help of $5,000 or more to a friend or family 
member in the next 10 years.  
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Appendix 6 
Description of Variables 
Incidence of Transfer – 0 if no transfer given to child, 1 if transfer given to child 
Transfer Amount – log of transfer amount 
Log Income – log of income including: earnings, unemployment, worker’s comp, pensions, 
annuities, SSI, welfare, capital income, disability income, other income and income of 
other household members, MINUS transfers from family members 
Log Net Worth – log of net worth which includes both housing and non-housing equity.  If net 
worth is negative, equals negative the log of the absolute value of net worth. 
Marital Status Variables – all 0/1 with 1 indicating in the marital state indicated 
Health Variables – all 0/1 with 1 indicating in the heath state indicated  
Age – in years 
Black – 1 if respondent is black, 0 otherwise 
# Biological Kids – does not include foster, step or adopted children 
Education Variables -  0/1 
# Kids<10 miles – number of non co resident children living within 10 miles  
% Kids male – percentage of biological children who are male 
Kids mean age – mean age of all biological children 
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Appendix 7 
 
The optimal savings from period 1 and services purchased in period 2 are: 
2*
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Substituting w*  into x2* into and taking the derivative with respect to s results in: 
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Assuming the preference parameter on services, α, is non-negative, as are I and A, then for positive 
changes in s the optimal services purchased (transfers) x2* will increase. 
 
